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Regulatory justifications: regulating European medicines to maximise market potential 
  
Dr Amanda Warren-Jones 
 
 
The justification for regulating is generally considered to rely on benefitting interested 
groups. Whereas, the traditional view is that regulators act as impartial arbiters balancing 
competing public and private interests, modern accounts consider regulation to be dominated 
by single interests, such as those of industry. This article challenges these theories by arguing 
that regulators are substantively (not just procedurally) motivated to justify their actions 
according to the goals set for them by the bodies that empower them. In consequence, 
regulators understand their goals as market-based objectives, prompting them to focus on 
maximising market potential. This is demonstrated in the context of regulating medicines in 
Europe, through the European Patent Organisation, the CJEU, and the European Medicines 
Agency. The analysis identifies that regulating to achieve market benefits is a better predictor 
of regulatory behaviour, but this behaviour frustrates goal-achievement (relating to effective 
and affordable medicines) and only incidentally enables benefits to accrue to specific groups.  
 
Keywords: regulatory theory; public and private interests; administrative decision-making; 
medicines regulation; patents; market authorisation 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the context of regulation1, the traditional legal approach is to regard regulators as impartial 
arbiters, fairly balancing competing public interests and the special interests of particular 
groups (eg industry, trade organisations, patients, and professionals). This approach has been 
challenged within economic analyses and continues to be expanded upon through other 
disciplinary approaches within the political and social sciences, as well as within public 
administration.2 More recently, academic commentary has linked consideration of outcomes 
(to determine why regulators prioritise specific interests) with how regulators are motived to 
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  µ5HJXODWLRQ¶UHODWHVWRDVSHFLILFOHJLVODWLYHLQVWUXPHQWRWKHUZLVHµUHJXODWLRQ¶UHODWHVWRJRYHUQDQFH
thereby extending beyond legislative instruments to include a wider raft of measures and decisions that 
moderate behaviour: &6FRWWµ5HJXODWLRQLQWKH$JHRI*RYHUQDQFHWKHULVHRIWKHSRVW-UHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶
in J Jordana and D Levi-Faur (eds) The Politics of Regulation:  Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the 
Age of Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004). 
2
  6HHHJ'$)DUEHUDQG33)ULFNH\µ7KH-XULVSUXGHQFHRI3XEOLF&KRLFH¶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Texax Law 
Review :6WUHHFNDQG3&6FKPLWWHUµ&RPPXQLW\PDUNHWVWDWH± and associations? The prospective 
FRQWULEXWLRQRILQWHUHVWJRYHUQDQFHWRVRFLDORUGHU¶5) 1(2) European Sociological Review 119; SM 
King, B6&KLOWRQDQG*(5REHUWVµ5HIOHFWLRQVRQ'HILQLQJWKH3XEOLF,QWHUHVW¶. 
Administration and Society 954; and 3&ROH\µ3XEOLF,QWHUHVWHG5HJXODWLRQ¶-2001) 28 Florida State 
University Law Review 7. 
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act in particular ways.3  The result is that understanding the interests that are served by 
regulation is split between: (1) those believing that the dominant interest is, and should be, 
that of the public, in which the regulator ZRUNVIRUDµJUHDWHUJRRG¶; 4 (2)  those working on 
the presumption that actors behave from selfish motives, which causes regulators to follow 
private interests (eg maximising utility or wealth), 5  or being politically/institutionally 
motivated by self-interest (eg democratic benefits from votes, corporate bias or the prospect 
of administrative benefits);6 and (3) those who believe that regulators have been captured by 
self-interested VSHFLDOLQWHUHVWVµLQWHUHVW groups¶7 Although regulatory capture is considered 
to occur when any sufficiently-positioned group is able to dictate policy, or to affect 
regulatory instruments or specific regulatory decisions, the majority of assessments in the 
field identify industry as the most likely group, even though the effects of its dominance 
could be ameliorated by incorporating public interest groups.8 
The intention in this article is not to comprehensively review this field, but to 
highlight adherence of existing academic commentary to two possible motives for UHJXODWRUV¶
actions: (1) being motivated towards good outcomes; or (2) being motivated towards selfish 
benefits of either the regulator or interest groups. While institutional theories have 
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  $*LQRVDUµ3XEOLF-,QWHUHVW,QVWLWXWLRQDOLVP$3RVLWLYH3HUVSHFWLYHRQ5HJXODWLRQ¶
Administration and Society 301. 
4
  This representing a context-based enumeration of community values supported by good reasons (M 
Feintuck, ³The Public Interest´ in Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2004)); being rights based (T 
Prosser, µ5HJXODWLRQ and Social Solidarity¶, (2006) 33(3) Journal of Law and Society 364); ethically based 
and embedded in legitimacy issues (R Brownsword and M Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the 
Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2012)) and as prudential decision-making running 
DORQJVLGHPRUDOOHJLWLPDF\5%URZQVZRUGµ5HVSRQVLEOH5HJXODWLRQ3UXGHQFH3UHFDXWLRQDQG
6WHZDUGVKLS¶Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 573); based on welfare economics (M 
Hantke-DomasµThe Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?¶
15 European Journal of Law and Economics 165); or deliberative (A Gutmann and D Thompson, Why 
Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton University Press, 2004)). 
5
  Eg *-6WLJOHUµ7KH7KHRU\RI(FRQRPLF5HJXODWLRQ¶Bell Journal of Economics & Management 
Science 3; 5$3RVQHUµ7KHRULHVRIHFRQRPLFUHJXODWLRQ¶Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science  335. 
6
  (J63HOW]PDQµ7RZDUGDPRUHJHQHUDOWKHRU\RIUHJXODWLRQ¶The Journal of Law and 
Economics 63HOW]PDQµ&RQVWLWXHQW,QWHUHVWDQG&RQJUHVVLRQDO9RWLQJ¶The Journal of 
Law and Economics 181; *%HFNHUµ7KHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWK\SRWKHVLVUHYLVLWHG$QHZWHVWRI3HOW]PDQ¶V
WKHRU\RIUHJXODWLRQ¶Public Choice 223;  J Abraham, µOn the prohibition of conflicts of interest 
in pharmaceutical regulation: precautionary limits aQGSHUPLVVLYHFKDOOHQJHV¶ Social Science & 
Medicine 648; AI Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing, 2004) Ch 4.  
7
  Eg M Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton University Press, 1955); E 
Jackson, Law and the Regulation of Medicines (Hart, 2012); P Drahos, µIntellectual Property and 
Pharmaceutical Markets: a nodal governance approach¶ Temple Law Review 401. 
8
  D Carpenter and DA Moss (eds), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to 
Limit it (Cambridge University Press, 2014), particularly Chapters 7 and 14; I Ayres and J Braithwaite, 
µTripartism: Regulatory Capture and EmpowermenW¶Law & Social Inquiry 435.  
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supplemented these motives of the regulator to incorporate values embedded within the 
decision-making process,9 they leave unchallenged these core motivations. 
This article supports an alternative explanation for behavioural norms: that actors are 
motivated to rationalise their behaviour to others10 and this results in seemingly inconsistent 
outcomes that can appear to be in the interests of the public, or of particular groups, or of the 
regulators themselves.  It follows that those involved in the regulatory system are motivated 
to act in ways which enable them to justify themselves to those that empower them (eg 
supranational institutions, Government, legal institutions, or the public). Requirements of 
accountability and transparency certainly underpin this perspective procedurally,11 but this 
article argues that substantively the need to explain actions forces regulators to focus on 
tracing a clear and justifiable link between policy and practice. This can be distinguished 
from regulation within existing discourses, which is seen as interests-based on the evidence 
of benefits accruing to specific actors (eg acting in the interests of industry in preference to 
the public interest). The assertion made here is that regulators are predominantly concerned to 
explain their efforts relative to the goals they have been given: irrespective of whether the 
goals derive from political mandates, or legislative remits which are encapsulated within 
institutional aims (long-term goals) and developed through policies (mid-term goals). 
Collaterally this means that benefits accrue incidentally and that attempts to subvert 
regulation (eg through short-term party politics, lobbying or bias, etc) can have only a limited 
effect. 
The regulation of medicines, existing and innovative, offers an ideal context in which 
to demonstrate the central claim of this article. The analysis focuses on just three key 
examples to evidence that regulators consistently justify their behaviour relative to the goals 
provided by those that empower them: the European Patent Organisation (EPOrg) which, 
together with the European Boards of Appeal, regulates the patent protection that facilitates 
the development of most innovative medicines; the judiciary, exemplified by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in dealing with trade in medicines and rights granted 
over them; and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which regulates market entry of 
innovative medicines, to confirm consistency even across independent agencies operating at 
different stages of the innovatory process. These examples are chosen to demonstrate that 
                                                          
9
  For an overview of these theories see: R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, Understanding Regulation: 
Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012), at 53-65 and for the public policy 
discourse overview see (n 2 ) at 305-306. 
10
  J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press, 1971). 
11
  R Baldwin, Rules and Government, (Oxford University Press, 1995), at 47. This links the concept of good 
regulation with why and how regulation accrues to the benefits of particular actors/institutions. 
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regulators take a market-based view of their goals and become motivated to prioritise market 
considerations, making it the enduring reason guiding regulatory behaviour even where 
policies and practices change.  
The article has three principal parts. First, the article provides a brief understanding of 
regulatory empowerment, identifies existing regulatory goals and makes the case that 
traditional accounts are insufficient to fully explain regulatory behaviour. Secondly, it is 
suggested that the justificatory basis for regulatory behaviour specific to medicines comes 
from regulators interpreting their goals as a requirement to maximise market potential. This 
means that regulators behave in response to changing market conditions and this can be 
understood by assessing current market potential for European medicines competing in global 
markets. Thirdly, the ways in which current market potential prompts specific regulatory 
practices are identified. This pattern is exemplified by: the implementation of core aspects of 
European patent law; decisions of the CJEU; and by the progressive regulatory initiatives 
adopted by the EMA. This suggests that, irrespective of which regulatory institution is 
assessed in a broader interpretation of medicines regulation, justifications are a good measure 
of actions. If regulators are truly focused on explaining their behaviour, market-based 
motives provide an accurate means of predicting how they will act. This enables a critique 
focused on any failure to achieve the goals set, in preference to one based on an idealised 
balancing of interests; and relates more directly to regulatory behaviour than assessing how 
interests accrue. 
 
2. Empowerment and goals 
 
Before considering the institutional and policy goals of regulatory bodies and the degree to 
which these goals relate to specific regulatory practices, it is necessary to briefly consider 
how decision-making bodies are empowered. 
 
2.1  Empowerment 
Regulatory institutions are empowered by the State, just as supranational organisations (such 
as the EU) are empowered by Member States, but this empowerment is not a static event. So 
one consequence of the assertion that regulators are motivated to explain their behaviour 
relative to the goals set by their empowering body is that it runs counter to existing evidence 
5 
 
DERXWUHJXODWRU\µGULIW¶DQGµVKLUNLQJ¶.12 Drifting and shirking recognise how far regulators¶ 
actions depart from their original (empowering) legislative remit, or from their institutional 
aims or specific policy goals. Adopting an analysis focused on the motivations which link 
goals with actions argues instead that it is the rationalising basis for behaviour which prompts 
a change in UHJXODWRUV¶DFWLRQV. In the context of medicines, what factually maximises market 
potential changes over time and it is this change which causes the original goals to be re-
interpreted or re-prioritised. The result is that regulatory behaviour only appears to be 
mismatched to goals. This leaves open the question of how susceptible to change regulators¶ 
goals are and this requires an example to expand on the nature of empowerment in a little 
more detail.  
The EMA¶V decision-making body, the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human 
Use (CHMP), has to account to: the EMA and through them to others within individual 
national regulatory agencies (eg through Management Boards,13 which are constrained by the 
national regulatory decision-making bodies that empower them);14 their decisions are also 
subject to supranational bodies within the EU (eg the Commission, 15  which in turn is 
accountable to the European Parliament and has its policy agenda set by the European 
Council);16 CHMP decisions must comply with the legislative requirements determined by 
                                                          
12
  '%6SHQFHµ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZDQG$JHQF\3ROLF\-Making: Rethinking the positive theory of political 
FRQWURO¶Yale Journal on Regulation 407. 
13
  Assessing the vertical accountability of the EMA to Member States via Management Boards, Buess 
identified that accountability does not reflect the level of autonomy (power) of the agency (M Buess, 
µ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ$JHQFLHV¶9HUWLFDO5HODWLRQVKLSVZLWKWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV'RPHVWLF6RXUFHVRI
$FFRXQWDELOLW\"¶Journal of European Integration 509) and that, while the EMA displays 
both de jure and de facto SROLWLFDOLQGHSHQGHQFHWKHUHLVIDUJUHDWHUVFRSHIRUKRUL]RQWDOµSHHU¶
DFFRXQWDELOLW\FRPLQJIURPQDWLRQDOUHJXODWRU\DQGPLQLVWHULDOVRXUFHV0%XHVVµ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
Agencies and their Management Boards: An assessment of accountability and demoi-craWLFOHJLWLPDF\¶
(2015) 22(1) Journal of European Public Policy /RRNLQJVSHFLILFDOO\DWWKH0DQDJHPHQW%RDUGV¶
perspective at the EMA, Makhashvili and Stephenson identified that, while the Board considered that 
financial independence is crucial to maintaining autonomy, decision-making independence is far more 
LQIOXHQFHGE\WKH&+03FRPSULVLQJPHPEHUVRIWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶1DWLRQDO&RPSHWHQW$XWKRULWLHVDQG
the Management Board influencing planning than by the Commission (L Makhashvili and P Stephenson, 
µ'LIIHUHQWLDWLQJ$JHQF\,QGHSHQGHQFH3HUFHSWLRQVIURP,QVLGHWKH(XURSHDQ0HGLFLQHV$JHQF\¶
9(1) Journal of Contemporary European Research  4).  
14
  $UJXLQJWKDWWKH(0$KDVJUHDWHUDXWRQRP\FRPSDUHGWRRWKHUDJHQFLHVVHH0/3*URHQOHHUµ7KH$FWXDO 
Practice of Agency Autonomy: Trading the developmental trajectories of the European Medicines Agency 
DQGWKH(XURSHDQ)RRG6DIHW\$XWKRULW\¶LQ*(NLHUWDQG$0DUWLQHGV2SHQ)RUXP&(63DSHU6HULHV
The Minda de Gunzberg Centre for European Studies, Harvard University (2011). 
http://ssrn.com/abstract+1904462, but that they are still constrained by design and accountability 
requirements, curtailing their complete autonomy, see: JG Christensen and V Lehmannµ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH
&DSDFLW\6WUXFWXUDO&KRLFHDQGWKH&UHDWLRQRI(8$JHQFLHV¶Journal of European Public 
Policy  176. 
15
  0(JHEHUJDQG-7URQGDOµ(8-level agencies: new executive centre formation or vehicles for national 
FRQWURO"¶Journal of European Public Policy 868. 
16
  (J%+DXUD\DQG38UIDOLQRµ0XWXDO7UDQVIRUPDWLRQDQGWKH'HYHORSPHQWRI(XURSHDQ3ROLF\Spaces. 
7KHFDVHRIPHGLFLQHVOLFHQVLQJ¶Journal of European Public Policy 431. 
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the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the Commission;17 and these in turn will 
also be distinguished and enforced through the CJEU. Each of these related institutions is in 
turn accountable to broader political and administrative oversight within Member States, 
motivating them to be seen to promote public interests (satisfying political mandates) and 
interest groups (serving economic interests). 
The implication is that embedded institutional aims and policy goals wax and wane in 
reflecting the public policy, political, legislative or administrative priorities of the 
empowering body. 18 These are framed to broader and more enduring goals, to ensure that the 
empowering body retains its credibility commitment.19 This refers to the need to regulate 
consistently, because industry will not commit resources where the regulatory environment is 
open to reversal and investments can be lost. The effects of this commitment can be easily 
identified where the bulk of investment in stem cell technology in the USA went to 
multipotent stem cells, because both Democratic and Republican Governments permissively 
regulate them.20 The flow of research investment did not change even when Democratic 
Governments signalled their approval of pluripotent stem cell developments, because 
Republican Governments regulate pluripotent stem cells prohibitively and this would 
necessarily result in lost investment over the long-term.21  
As each empowering body (principal) relays its goal-setting to the body (agent) that it 
influences, changes in interpretation occur. This can be caused by the purposiveness of the 
communication,22  which means that the understanding of the conveyor-principal and the 
recipient-agent may not match. So the principal and agent must agree a mutual purpose-based 
                                                          
17
  Substantively through measures relating to practice (eg Regulation 1235/2010/EC amending, as regards 
pharmacovigilance of medicinal products for human use, (31.12.2010) OJ EU L348/1-16), as well as in 
terms of the embedded competency that was accorded to the EMA at its inception (Regulation 
726/2004/EC laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal 
products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency, Title IV (30.4.2004) 
OJ EU L136/1-33). 
18
  In assessing the impact of political motivations see: C Davis and J Abraham, Unhealthy Pharmaceutical 
Regulation: Innovation, Politics and Promissory Science (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and in assessing the 
broader relationship of political motives to the type of regulatory infrastructure (eg agency or network) see 
5'.HOHPHQDQG$'7DUUDQWµ7KH3ROLWLFDO)RXQGDWLRQVRIWKH(XURFUDF\¶West European 
Politics  922.  
19
  %/HY\DQG36SLOOHUµ7KH,QVWLWXWLRQDO)RXQGDWLRQVRI5HJXODWRU\&RPPLWPHQW¶Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization 2015'7ROOLVRQµ3XEOLF&KRLFHDQG/HJLVODWLRQ¶Virginia 
Law Review 339, at 345 and notably as elevated to an independent, competing theory: J G Christensen, 
µ3XEOLF,QWHUHVW5HJXODWLRQ5HFRQVLGHUHG)URP&DSWXUHWR&UHGLEOH&RPPLWPHQW¶) Jerusalem 
Papers in Regulation and Governance, Working Paper No 19. 
20
  (J&HQWUHIRU$PHULFDQ3URJUHVVµ(PEU\RQLF6WHP&HOO5HVHDUFKE\WKH1XPEHUV¶, 17 April 2007, 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/technology/news/2007/04/17/2887/embryonic-stem-cell-research-by-
the-numbers/ . 
21
  A Warren-JonHVµ5HDOLVLQJ1HZ+HDOWK7HFKQRORJLHVWKHSUREOHPVRIUHJXODWLQJKXPDQVWHPFHOOVLQWKH
86$¶Medical Law Review 1. 
22
  31RQHWµ7KH/HJLWLPDWLRQRI3XUSRVLYH'HFLVLRQV¶California Law Review 263. 
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meaning, or the agent must limit the scope of their interpretation to only the divergences it 
can justify. As the communication is repeated through different regulatory levels, 23  the 
distorting effect of the communication becomes magnified. In addition, the specific focus of 
the principal relative to that of the agent modifies the primacy of specific aspects of policy. 
For example, a politically focused goal-setter may intend something quite different to a 
public policy focused agent.  
How stringently the agent will be motivated to adhere to the regulatory goals set for it 
by its principal will be influenced by factors such as the balance of power between them.24 
The more power the principal exerts, the more the agent is impelled to account closely to the 
goals the principal sets; the less the power exerted, the more the agent can be diverted to 
focus upon different goals as it wishes. Similarly, the nature of the deregulation that occurred 
in setting up the agency defineVWKHDJHQW¶VFRPSHWHQFHWRDFW25 and this may be treated more 
or less prescriptively. These are issues that have already been explored within actor-centred 
and institutional theories, and supplement this analysis in exploring how the dislocation 
between goals and actions takes effect to varying extents, depending upon the agency being 
considered. This article focuses instead upon the central communication and how it prompts 
regulatory behaviour. 
Even this brief consideration demonstrates that in order to dominate regulation, 
interest groups such as industry, patient groups or medical professional associations would 
have to control the legislative process, judicial interpretations, all of the empowering policy-
making bodies and the agency decision-makers in every regulatory agency. So, while there is 
no denial that corporate bias or other self-interests undoubtedly influence regulation, they are 
arguably only a minor part of a conglomeration of influences brought to bear at different 
stages and on different levels of regulation. Regulation is hierarchical, with requirements to 
account for behaviour irrespective of whether the regulator is a policy- or decision-maker. As 
such a more significant influence is the need to explain behaviour to those that empower in 
                                                          
23
  Presuming a model of multi-level regulatory governance in which regulation occurs vertically 
(hierarchically), and respecting that it also operates horizontally (between peers). 
24
  For example, the lack of scientific knowledge by those that empower the CHMP gives it primacy over the 
Commission, Select Committee and the CouncilVHH7*HKULQJDQG6.UDSRKOµ6XSUDQDWLRQDOUHJXODWRU\
agencies between independence and control: the EMEA and the authorization of pharmaceuticals in the 
(XURSHDQ6LQJOH0DUNHW¶Journal of European Public Policy 208. 
25
  J Donahue and R Zeckhauser, Collaborative Governance: private roles for turbulent times (Princeton 
University Press, 2011). For more on methods of incorporating public interests in policy formation see: C 
Sirianni, Investing in Democracy: Engaging citizens in collaborative governance (Brookings Institute, 
2009), Chapter 2. 
8 
 
terms of the goals they have set. This requires some exploration of how goals relate to 
practices in the specific context of medicines regulation. 
  
2.2 Goals 
Once a new medicine is invented and this becomes known, social pressure immediately 
focuses on gaining access to it26 and early access is in ERWK WKH UHJXODWRU¶V DQG LQGXVWU\¶V
interests. The result of withholding access is often that patients die or receive less beneficial 
treatments, making it imperative that unnecessary constraints on access to originator 
medicines (new small molecule chemicals (SMCs), biologics and combinations)27 are not 
imposed. As a result, it is easy to see why one of the most debated issues affecting modern 
medicine is how regulation can secure timely access to originators where the existence and 
proliferation of medicines relies upon market exclusivity.  
Existing discourses around this nexus of public/industry interests in the context of 
regulating medicines cast the pharmaceutical industry as fixated on exclusivity28 and the 
public as served by increased access29 to medicines.30 The inherent presumption is based on 
an understanding of regulatory bodies, such as the EPOrg (and its decision-making body, the 
European Patent Office (EPO)) and the EMA, as being neutral arbiters balancing the 
competing interests of industry and the public. This construction enables regulation to be 
critiqued on the degree of deviance from a maximal equilibrium.31 Yet analysis of the policy 
and practice governing the EPOrg and the EMA identifies a very different motivational 
perspective, which challenges both this traditional construction of neutrality, as well as 
dominant interest perspectives. 
Evidencing links betweeQ (XURSHDQ UHJXODWRUV¶ DLPV DQG their priorities, which are 
given practical application through agency practice (changing/overlaying existing 
                                                          
26
  Eg J Siegel-,W]NRYLFKµ3DWLHQWV demanding access to cancer drugs call off hunger strike¶
British Medical Journal 1352(XURSHDQ3DWLHQWV¶Academy on Therapeutic Innovation, µPatient-led   
European Patients¶ $FDGHP\RQ7KHUDSHXWLF,QQRYDWLRQ¶ODXQFKHGHGXFDWLQJSDWLHQWVDERXWPHGLFLQHV
R&D¶ 27 March 2012, www.patientsacademy.eu/index.php/en/news/press-releases/45-eupati-launch-pr. 
27
  Combinations refer to SMCs with more than one active ingredientDVRSSRVHGWRµFRPELQDWLRQSURGXFWV¶
which refer to medical devices/treatments which amalgamate biological and man-made materials. 
28
  Through patent protection or trade secrecy and (for medicines) additionally through supplementary 
protection certificates (SPCs) and market exclusivity of clinical trials data. 
29
  Accessibility is about physically obtaining innovations (either to continue development or proliferated to 
end-markets) conveniently, which are safe and reliable, in sufficient quantity, affordably and timely.    
30
  ,QDJOREDOFRQWH[WµDFFHVVWRPHGLFLQHV¶DQGµHTXDOLW\RIDFFHVV¶GHEDWHVeg CM Ho, Access to Medicine 
in the Global Economy (Oxford University Press, 2011); in a European/domestic context, concerning 
µDFFHVVWRQRYHOPHGLFLQHV¶: eg RE Epstein, Overdose: How excessive government regulation stifles 
pharmaceutical innovation (Yale University Press, 2006). 
31
  Eg N TuominenµAn IP perspective on defensive patenting strategies in the EU pharmaceutical industry¶ 
(2012) 34(8) European Intellectual Property Review 541. 
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institutional norms) and are supported by legislative instruments and court decisions, is easily 
proven. In the context of medicines regulation, economic interests within institutional aims 
and policy documents that are put into effect through specific legislative instruments can 
easily be identified within the broader policy landscape in the EU.32  While these goals 
constrain the standards of decision-making bodies within the EMA, for example, it is argued 
that this does not identify what prompts the agency to implement its aims and policies as 
specific decisions/operating practices to explicitly govern its behaviour. It is a fully 
explanatory link between goals and behaviour which is missing, but which is necessary to 
open up regulatory behaviour to public scrutiny.  
In terms of patenting innovative medicines, the facilitative nature of the EPOrg is 
evident in its inception, 33  DV ZHOO DV EHLQJ HPEHGGHG ZLWKLQ WKH (32¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO
framework through its mission statement, which is to µsupport innovation, competitiveness 
and economic growth across Europe¶.34  Clearly this is a remit which already marks the 
interests of the regulator as partisan, undermining any presumptions of neutrality. These aims 
can be linked to the broad practices of the EPO supporting: innovation through the provision 
of patent rights and the Appeal Board decisions which generally interpret the law in favour of 
patentability;35 competitiveness through ensuring favourable regulatory comparability with 
competitor patent-JUDQWLQJ ERGLHV WR HQVXUH DJDLQVW D µEUDLQ-µ RU µWHFK-GUDLQ¶ WR FRXQWULHV 
outside of Europe;36 and economic growth which is monitored by a Chief Economist,37 and 
encouraged by working with other countries to ensure that their regulatory environment and 
enforcement is advantageous to European innovators. 38  While this describes why broad 
                                                          
32
  Eg The (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQVWDWHVWKDWLWµSODQVLWVZRUNLQFOXGLQJWKHGUDIWLQJRIQHZOHJLVODWLRQEDVHG
RQWKHSROLWLFDOSULRULWLHVVHWE\WKH3UHVLGHQW¶(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQZHESDJHVhttp://ec.europa.eu/ 
atwork/planning-and-preparing/index_en.htm), which results in policy documents (eg the 2008 European 
Commission report, Safe, Innovative and Accessible Medicines: a Renewed Vision of the Pharmaceutical 
Sector,  (2008) COM(2008) 666 final, especially at 4, 14-15, http://ec.europa.eu/health/ human-
use/package_en.htm) and the Communication from the Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 
Report, SEC(2009) 952 (2009)); and incorporated within legislative instruments (eg Regulation 
536/2014/EC on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use (2014) OJ EU L158/1). 
33
  Under the European Patent Convention 1973, in which the Preamble states its purpose WREHµto 
strengthen co-operation between the States of Europe in respect RIWKHSURWHFWLRQRILQYHQWLRQV¶ 
34
  EPO website: www.epo.org/about-us/office/mission.html and this is replicated in the intention of the 
unitary patent to be an instrument to facilitate the proliferation of technology throughout Europe 
(Regulation 1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
protection, Recital (1) (31.12.2-12) OJ EU L361/1-8. 
35
  Eg T144/83 DU PONT/Appetite Suppressant [1987] EPOR 6. 
36
  Eg Trilateral Project B3b, Report on Comparative study on biotechnology patent practices: Comparative 
VWXG\RQ³UHDFK-WKURXJKFODLPV´ (2001) Trilateral Projects, EPO.  
37
  The present being Theon van Dijk, www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2013/20130904.html.  
38
  The ECAP project was the initiative of the EPO to work with the ASEAN (Association of South East 
Asian Nations) in developing and enforcing IP rights (http://www.ecap-project.org/), the effect of which is 
to make it easier for those with a European patent to obtain rights within South East Asian countries.  
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practices can be accounted for by being linked to the institutional/policy aims that prompt 
them, it does not account for specific regulatory decisions, changing practices,39 or why other 
implementing options were not adopted. So what is missing is a motivation which accounts 
for this broader tranche of practices. 
Similarly, in terms of the EMA it is possible to identify the institutional aims, which 
are split between the need to provide scientific evaluation to promote public health and to 
µsupport research and innovation to stimulate the development of better medicines¶40 This 
identifies that there is more than a facilitative role expected of the EMA, but how much its 
duty to secure public safety is/should take priority over its facilitative role is debatable. The 
pertinent point here is that these institutional aims can be traced directly to policy documents 
as they have changed over time and to the practices that have given effect to them. For 
example, the aim of facilitating the development of better medicines resulted in a policy to 
promote rapid access to safe and effective medicines in both the 200541 and 201142 policy 
instruments, but the 2005 policy gave rise to the Fast Track system of market authorisation 
for therapeutic equivalence and where there are no new active pharmaceutical ingredients 
(APIs); and the 2011 policy gave rise to the Early Access to Medicines Scheme (EAMS) and 
a pilot for adaptive licensing (an adaptive pathway). The policy goal had not changed, but the 
practical application took an entirely different form. This indicates that what is missing is an 
understanding of how the motivation to act prompted a change in the implementation of an 
enduring policy goal. 
This brief assessment goes some way towards linking aims/policies with practices, 
supporting the point that the goals alone are insufficient to account for all regulatory 
behaviours or even for the choice of goals prioritised. Within this analysis, there is a clear 
commonality in regulators prioritising PDUNHWFRQVLGHUDWLRQVµHFRQRPLFJURZWK¶, developing 
µEHWWHUPHGLFLQHV¶LQWHUSUHWHGDVHQFRXUDJLQJearly access) over collateral aims and policies 
(such as safety, reliability or training). Similarly the regulatory goals are not formulated by 
reference to the pursuit of equally worthy ambitions which are excluded, such as achieving 
                                                          
39
  For example, why the general principle to construe exclusionary provisions narrowly may suddenly be 
departed from: see G2/06 and T1372/04 WARF/Use of Embryos [2009] EPOR 15. 
40
  EMA Mission Statement, www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/about_us/ 
general/general_content_000106.jsp [italics added] and derived from Regulation 726/2004/EC laying 
down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency (2004) OJ EU L136/1. 
41
  EMA, The European Medicines Agency Road Map to 2010: preparing the ground for the future 
EMA/H/34163/03/Final. 
42
  EMA, 5RDG0DSWRWKH(0$¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRVFLHQFHPHGLFLQHVDQGKHDOWK(2011), 
www.ema.europa.eu/ docs/en_GB/document_library/Report/ 2011/01/WC500101373.pdf. 
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social progress. For example, in the context of the EMA it could be expected that an 
emphasis be placed on promoting the development of cures in place of existing treatments, 
rather than the current emphasis on developing personalised medicines in place of traditional 
chemical-based medicines where the main benefits are to reduce side-effects. This analysis 
cannot fully account for why market concerns take priority over other considerations in either 
policy or decision-making processes, other than suggesting that collateral aims/policies may 
not be as successfully justifiable across so many diverse contexts (eg not as desirable to those 
that empower the regulator).  
Identifying that market considerations are what link regulatory goals with practices 
would explain how goals and practices may change, but the justification remains the same. 
Goals change with different market strategies and practices change in response to changing 
market trends. So being able to predict regulatory behaviour relies upon understanding 
precisely what those market trends are. 
 
3. Market potential as justification for policy implementation 
In order to confirm that regulators are motivated to consider market trends, there must be a 
demonstrable link between the institutional aims and policy goals identified in the previous 
section and existing market profiles. The link suggested in this article is that regulators 
interpret their goals as market-based objectives, motivated by markets being more favourable 
to their empowering body, but also because markets are a more achievable ambition than 
aiming at economic benefits. Regulators can demonstrate they have achieved economic 
progress if they can show their actions are designed to maximise market potential, because it 
is a moot point that taking advantage of market trends results in economic benefit. This gets 
around having to prove that regulatory behaviour directly result in economic growth, such as 
being linked to improvements in the balance of trade, or WR JDLQV LQ VSHFLILF FRPSDQLHV¶
market share or sales.   
Market trends within Europe relate to appreciating its competitive strengths, its scope 
to exploit emerging markets and ways of minimising comSHWLWRUV¶DGYDQWDJHVDQGWKLVPDNHV
LW QHFHVVDU\ WR FRQVLGHU (XURSH¶V PDUNHW SRWHQWLDO LQ WKH EURDGHU FRQWH[W RI FRPSHWLWLYH
global markets in medicines.  
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As one of the leading producers of originator medicines,43 it is crucial that Europe 
secures foreign and domestic markets by developing novel, effective and affordable 
medicines,44 as timely as possible. At present, this focuses on ensuring that pharmaceutical 
innovation is sustainable and can withstand up-coming challenges. Crucially this means that 
market growth can be maximised if: regulation supports (XURSH¶V VWUHQJWKV in developing 
originator medicines; Europe is well-placed to deal with market growth in Brazil, China, 
India, North America; and parallel importers within Europe can be controlled.45 This requires 
a brief understanding of how global markets interface with key legal rights governing 
medicines development and proliferation. 
The implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 1994 (TRIPs) was designed as a mechanism for enabling developed country 
pharmaceutical industries to exploit foreign markets by globally disseminating patent rights.  
In the context of medicines regulation, these markets had been inaccessible due to the risk of 
copying, which enables medicines to be marketed at much lower prices compared to the 
development costs (R&D) which must be offset by originator producers. Reluctance to 
implement TRIPs in developing and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) resulted in TRIPs 
being used by developed countries as a platform for Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (known 
as TRIPs-Plus), demanding further exclusivity protection beyond patents.46    
This revolves around three product-market identities: originators (confined to 
countries with strong patent protection); generics (which legitimately copy originators 
because the patent is no longer active); and µillegal generics¶ (which replicate originators 
protected by patent rights in another country, but which are either not prohibited/not enforced 
in the country of production). In the short-term, TRIPs-Plus provisions benefit European 
originator producers because FTAs secure foreign markets ahead of national generic and 
illegal generic companies by providing similar or even greater exclusivity than in Europe. For 
example, European pharmaceutical companies increased market presence in Colombia with 
                                                          
43
 The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Association, The Pharmaceutical Industry in 
Figures report (2013), p7, identifies that the UK and Germany are market leaders, www.efpia.eu/uploads/ 
Figures_Key_ Data_2013.pdf . 
44
  (n 42). 
45
  (n 43) at 4. Parallel importers will be discussed in 4.2.1. 
46
  Requiring that equivalent supplementary protection and data exclusivity measures are adopted, and that 
data linkage (preventing market authorisation ahead of proven patent expiry) is introduced. For more see:  
D AcquahµExtending the Limits of Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Data Outside the EU-Is there 
a Need to Rebalance?¶International Review of Intellectual Property & Competition Law 256; 
R Bhardwaj et al.µThe Impact of Patent Linkage on Marketing of Generics Drugs¶Journal of 
Intellectual Property Rights 18 (2013) 316. 
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the aim of manufacturing medicines locally and distributing in the Andean region and Central 
America.47    
These access-to-market mechanisms have been tethered to restrictions on access-to-
resources needed as starting materials for developed country originators, protected through 
the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 (CBD), the Bonn Guidelines, 48  and more 
recently the Nagoya Protocol 2010.49  Arguably Nagoya Protocol provisions on capacity 
building50²in concert with technology transfer and benefit sharing provisions²provide the 
basis for developed countries within Europe growing µHQGRJHQRXV UHVHDUFK¶ LQ developing 
and LDCs to gain access to starting materials in the short-term and creating future 
competitors in the long-term. Attempts to balance the risk of stifling national growth in LDCs 
before national industry building can take hold is a key reason that TRIPs implementation has 
again been delayed51 and is likely to continue being put off as long as dHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV¶
interests dominate global regulation. 
Friction between competing interests results in seemingly immutable divisions,52 but 
inexorably TRIPs is shifting global pharmaceutical capabilities and, with them, changing 
global markets. As countries are required to comply with TRIPs, shifts occur because 
national medicine production must either accommodate new laws or adapt to fill emerging 
market gaps. For example, countries which traditionally produced illegal generics (eg India), 
but now newly TRIPs-compliant, are constrained to produce generics which must wait for 
originator medicines to come off patent. The alternative is that medicine production is 
injuncted or seized as counterfeits as soon as they enter a jurisdiction in which patent rights 
                                                          
47
  Eg  in 2014, Abbott bought Lafrancol (which was previously bought by Synthesis) which made it the 
second largest pharmaceutical company in Colombia, just behind the Colombian pharmaceutical company 
Tecnoquimicas SA, see: (O7LHPSR µAbbott Colombia Pega Salto eQ(VFDODIRQ)DUPDFHXWLFR¶  -XQH
2014, www.eltiempo.com/ archivo/documento/CMS-14108896. 
48
  Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
out of their Utilisation adopted by the Conference of the Parties of the CBD at its sixth meeting, The 
Hague,  April 2002. 
49
  For more see: C Herrlinger and M Kock µBiodiversity Laws: An Emerging Regulation on Genetic 
5HVRXUFHVRUµ,3RQ/LIH¶WKURXJKWKH%DFNGRRU"¶ Bio-Science Law Review 119. 
50
  Eg on capacity building notably Articles 18, 22 and 23 of the Nagoya Protocol, adopted through 
Regulation 511/2014/EC on Compliance Measures for Users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing Benefits Arising from their Utilisation (2014) OJ EU 
L150/59. 
51
  Council for TRIPs, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 (WTO Document IP/C/24, 2013). 
52
 Eg O FasanµCommitment and compliance in international law: a study of the implementation of the WTO 
TRIPs Agreement in Nigeria and South Africa¶ African Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 191; L Laxman and AH AnsariµThe interface between TRIPs and CBD: efforts towards 
harmonisation¶ Journal of International Trade Law & Policy 108; P XiongµPatents in 
TRIPs-Plus provisions and the interpretation of free trade agreements and TRIPs: do they affect public 
KHDOWK"¶Journal of World Trade 155. 
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exist. 53  This shift has the effect of spreading the generics market out from developed 
countries with robust pre-TRIPs patent protection, because generic producers in developing 
and LDCs have far lower overhead costs and can undercut production costs in comparison 
with developed country producers. 54  For example, India already offers pharmaceutical 
FRPSDQLHVVNLOOHGVFLHQWLVWDQGUHVHDUFKIDFLOLWLHVIRUDIUDFWLRQRI(XURSH¶VFRVW55 Neither is 
technological complexity proving a barrier to competition. India is preparing to position itself 
as a global leader of biosimilars,56 irrespective of it being more difficult to replicate them 
from biologics (compared with generics from SMCs). Similarly China is capacity building its 
supply of starting materials essential for the development and production of biologics.57 
At the same time global demand for cheap illegal generics, unmet by newly legitimate 
generic-producing countries, is likely to be filled by LDCs with little pre-existing 
manufacturing capacity. This creates potential for new global centres of illegal generic 
production, and increases national manufacturing capabilities. Developing countries with 
manufacturing capacity are outsourcing supply to LDCs looking to grow their manufacturing 
or distribution networks. For instance, Cipla, (an Indian generic company) established 
business links with 8JDQGD¶VSKDUPDFHXWLFDOFRPSDQ\4XDOLW\&KHPLFDO,QGXVWU\ to supply 
not only national demand, but demand in neighbouring LDCs.58 Another example relates to 
transferring technology from developing countries to LDCs inherent in the agreement 
enabling Brazil to construct a manufacturing facility for the production of first-line anti-
retroviral medicines in Mozambique.59  
                                                          
53
  Eg Delhi High Court decision in Glenmark v Merck Sharp >@37-\RWKL'DWWDµ'HOKL+&*OHQPDUN
FDQ¶WVHOOGLDEHWHVGUXJ=LWD=LWD-0HW¶0DUFKThe Hindu Business Line, www.thehindubusiness 
line.com/companies/glenmark-loses-diabetes-drug-case-to-merck/article7015446.ece; Request for 
Consultations by India, European Union ± Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408 (May 11, 2011) 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm; Request for Consultations by Brazil, 
European Union ± Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409; Regulation 608/2013/EU concerning 
customs enforcement of intellectual property rights ((2013) OJ EU L181/15), which states that in-transit 
goods which do not clearly identify where they are continuing onto must either be proven to be in transit or 
risk being destroyed for breaching patents (Art 2(1)(e)) or medicinal SPCs (Art 2(1)(f)). 
54
  In 2013 India accounted for 40% (by volume) of USA generics import and this is expected to increase with 
emphasis in developed countries on cost-effective care (eg Obamacare): India Ratings & Research, Impact 
of 2013 US FDA Actions on India Pharma (Special Report) (India Rating & Research, 2014). 
55
  S Chaudhuri, The WTO DQG ,QGLD¶V3KDUPDFHXWLFDO ,QGXVWU\3DWHQW3URWHFWLRQ75,3VDQG'HYHORSLQJ
Countries (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
56
  H MalhotraµBiosimilar and non-Innovator Biotherapeutics in India: An Overview of the Current 
Situation¶ (2011) 39 Biologicals 321. 
57
  W Hoffman, µ7KH6KLIWLQJ&XUUHQWVRI%LRVcience Innovation¶ Global Policy 76.  
58
  In-Pharma µ8JDQGD¶V 4&, WR ,QYHVW P LQ $,'6 DQG $QWL-malarial Drug Capacity¶ (In-Pharma, 
Technologist.com, 2011). 
59
  WHO, WIPO and WTO (2013)  Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Interaction 
Between Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade (London, 2013). 
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The impact of international regulation fails to address general domestic demands for 
medicines specific to LDCs, 60  or to encourage local investment in R&D. 61  The Doha 
Declaration 2001, Paragraph 6 62  enables LDCs with no manufacturing capacity to 
compulsorily license medicines from another country,63 but is arguably limited to public 
health problems such as widespread epidemics and only in limited quantities even though not 
currently confined to emergencies.64 In the long-term these global industry shifts could help 
to grow domestic capabilities in these LDCs, but in the meantime Doha is debatably little 
more than a limited exception to protect public health and research use. 
This analysis demonstrates that European regulators are engaged in facilitating access 
to medicines globally (beyond humanitarian contexts), even in the face of inevitably helping 
to grow the competitors who are already pricing pharmaceutical manufacturers within Europe 
out of the market. The production of generics is already a migrating market. Accessing new 
markets (open with TRIPs-compliance) is a collaborative effort, engaging with national 
industry in manufacturing and distributing patented medicines on a sliding scale of 
diminishing returns over time. This is because acceptance of restrictive terms under TRIPs-
Plus provisions will only prevail during periods of growth in domestic capabilities. As soon 
as developing and LDCs have established their own industries, trade negotiations will 
become a more balanced affair.  In the meantime, European regulators have a clear incentive 
to grow specific markets: (1) encouraging originators enables Europe to expand markets it 
                                                          
60
  C Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing (Research Paper 
41, South Center, 2011); see also C Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in 
Developing Countries (South Centre, 2010). 
61
  J Arkinstall et al, µThe Reality Behind the Rhetoric: How European Policies Risk Harming Access to 
Generic Medicines in Developing Countries¶ Journal of Generic Medicines 14. 
62
  Doha Declaration, Paragraph 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001),  www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm and WT/L/540 and Corr.1(2003), www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm/; implemented within Europe through Regulation 816/2006/EC on 
compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to 
countries with public health problems ((2006) OJ L157/1), and implemented within the UK as s128A, UK 
Patents Act 1977. 
63
  Eg Natco Pharma Ltd v Bayer Corporation [2013] The Intellectual Property Appellate Board, (Order No 
45 of 2013), www.ipab.tn.nic.in/045-2013.htm. 
64
  Originally dHILQHGDVDµQDWLRQDOHPHUJHQF\RURWKHUcircumstances of extreme uUJHQF\¶$UWLFOHE
TRIPs) and designed to enact the UN Millennium Development Goals (UN Millennium Development 
Goals 2000, Development Goal III, Resolution 19; currently MDG set to expire in 2015, www.un.org/ 
millenniumgoals/). This interpretation was supported by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
µDeclaration on the TR,3V$JUHHPHQWDQG3XEOLF+HDOWK¶ (9-14th November 2001), Ministerial Conference 
Fourth Session (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2) µ'RKD'HFODUDWLRQ¶SDUDFDOWKRXJKGLVSXWHGE\VRPH
FRPPHQWDWRUV39DQGRUHQDQG-&YDQ(HFNKDXWHµ7KH:72'HFLVLRQRQ3DUDJUDSKRIWKH'RKD
Declaration on the TRIPS AgreHPHQWDQG3XEOLF+HDOWK0DNLQJLWZRUN¶Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 779 and carried into the wider 2005 Decision wording which exemplifies use as µonly 
in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
FRPPHUFLDOXVH¶: WTO General Council, Annex to the Amendment of the TRIPs Agreement (6 December 
2005) WT/L/641 which had until 31st December 2015 to be accepted. 
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already leads; (2) promoting newly-valued medicines responds to market gaps, arguably 
increasing the potential for down-stream development and quickening the pace of the 
proliferation of up-stream technology; and (3) in expanding earlier access to generic 
production Europe may maintain its existing market lead over an expanding field of global 
competitors. 
If these three market potentials correlate to existing and recent changes in regulatory 
behaviour, it confirms that regulators are motivated to interpret their goals relative to market 
trends and justify their behaviour as supporting maximising current market potential. Inherent 
within this is a need to assess the degree to which regulators can/cannot effectively support 
these market potentials and the degree to which this equates to achieving the goals set in 
either promoting economic growth or securing better medicines. This enables a distinction to 
be made between regulators being incapable of achieving their goals within the limits of their 
existing powers and goals being capable of being affected but not being met, both of which 
identify that regulators are more focused on explaining their behaviour than on actually 
achieving their goals. 
 
4. Practical implementation of market potential 
 
4.1  Patents: regulating the development of medicines innovation 
Patents are often described as monopolistic, but this presumes an innovation flow which 
ignores how many patented medicines never reach the market and that, even when 
VXFFHVVIXOO\PDUNHWHG LQGLYLGXDOSDWHQWV UHSUHVHQWYHU\GLIIHUHQW OHYHOV RI µPDUNHW JUDE¶.65 
Focusing on exclusivity also overlooks that patents fundamentally require disclosure of the 
innovation so it can be recreated (eg having the knowledge from a published patent66  for full 
proliferation once exclusivity expires),67 and facilitate access in the life of the patent for 
limited purposes (eg being licensed, for resale as a parallel trader or falling within an 
exempted category).68 Hence, patents both deter access (by imposing a period of exclusivity) 
and encourage access (by protecting investment, incentivising creation and requiring 
disclosure). Without patents innovators would not put their medicines into the public domain 
                                                          
65
  Market grab means the value of the patent in terms of market share, which is predominantly reliant upon 
the relationship of the patented product/process to the existing market, but is similarly reliant on other 
factors which contribute to market share such as the branding strategy, status of the company in the field, 
number and nature of competitors, etc. 
66
  European Patent Convention 2000 (EPC), Art 83; G2/98 Requirement for claiming priority of the same 
invention [2001] OJ EPO 413. 
67
  EPC, Art 63(1) granting 20 years of patent protection from the date of first filing. 
68
  See Unified Patent Court Agreement (2013) OJ EPO C175/1, Art 27 and this includes defensible use. 
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(by marketing if protected by trade secrecy,69 or data/market exclusivity) until they were sure 
they had exhausted all commercial value. 
If there must be patents, the question is not whether they are restrictive, but how they 
relate to market growth? The answer relies on three factors which are central in determining 
how effectively a patent results in market grab: (1) the strength of the patent; (2) how the 
innovation relates to the existing technological field; and (3) how inaccessible licenses are. 
Whether or not this market grab has the effect of encouraging innovation proliferation, and by 
association increases economic growth, or slows down the pace of innovation is also related to 
the breadth of research exemptions. While broader exemptions reduce the restrictive effect of 
patents to facilitate the growth of competitors and increase the pace of innovation, narrow 
exemptions facilitate strong lead/originator rights by keeping competitors to a minimum and 
slowing the pace of innovation. In combination, these are the most crucial mechanisms by which 
to identify the extent to which patent regulators can affect markets/economic growth. 
 
4.1.1 Strength of patents 
Patent provisions 70  give the patent holder exclusionary rights over the patented 
product/process,71 and there are three relevant forms of patent in this context: product per se; 
µuse claims¶; and processes.  
 
Product per se patents 
Product per se patents are the strongest form of protection, extending to the product no matter 
how it is produced or what its use.  Traditionally the most criticised for excluding access, 
product per se rights convey the potential for market control and historically resulted in rights 
over medicines being excluded.72 For SXEOLFLQWHUHVWUHDVRQVWKHSDWLHQW¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWVVKRXOG
guide treatment decisions (rather than the avoidance of licence fees) and public interest is 
                                                          
69
 Protected by common law within individual Member States (eg in the UK see: Coco v AN Clark 
(Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117; Mason v The Provident 
Supply and Clothing Co  [1913] AC 724, /LQGQHUY0XUGRFN¶V*DUDJH[1950] 83 CLR 629; Terrapin Ltd v 
%XLOGHUV¶6XSSO\&R[1967] RPC 375, but see VestergaardFrandsen v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2010] FSR 2 
and currently the subject of a new European Directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how and 
business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (provisionally 
agreed 18 December 2015: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15382-2015-REV-1/en/pdf. 
70
 Unitary patents are granted through the EPO and sit alongside the existing bundle of national rights (eg UK 
Patents Act 1977 (as amended) (UKPA), s139(7)), DGRSWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶OHJDOSURYLVLRQVLQDVPXFKDV
they comply across Europe, (Regulation 1257/2012/EC (n 34), Arts 3, 5 and 7); Unified Patent Court 
Agreement (n 68), Art 25. 
71
 See Unified Patent Court Agreement Q$UWHJ8.3$VµRWKHUV¶PHDQLQJWKLUGSDUWLHVZLWKRXW
license or exemption/defence). 
72
 Former (pre-TRIPs compliance) India Patent Act 1970; see also Section 3(1) (x) the Zanzibar Industrial 
Property Act (Tanzania) 2008. 
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similarly the underlying rationale for requirements for moral innovation.73 Within Europe such 
limitations have gradually been eroded²exclusions affecting only some surgical, therapeutic or 
diagnostic techniques which directly affect treatment,74 and only some immoral innovations 
being prevented.75 Such erosions represent market expansion opportunities. At root, product per 
se patents restrict only to the extent that they exclude third parties so the innovator can 
develop and market; or by requiring royalties for third parties to develop related competitor 
products or next generation innovations. Innovations which do not rely on the originator are 
unrestricted by it.  This means that on a general basis, patent law has developed to provide 
VFRSH WR µLQYHQW DURXQG¶ H[LVWLQg rights and this is essential for keeping up the pace of 
innovation with healthy competition. 
 
µ8VH-FODLPV¶: newly-valued medicines   
More recently patent law has allowed that new purposes for existing products/originators is 
protectable through expanding contexts of use claims (specific to medicines these are known 
DV µLQGLFDWLRQV¶)76 Patent law practice has diverged on the issue of whether a new technical 
effect on its own can warrant protection, but the pertinent point here is that there has been a 
definitive lowering of qualification thresholds in accepting the patentability of innovations 
which are only marginally new and inventive. 77 Protection to these use-bound indications is 
only good against infringers using the same medicine to treat the same condition or to 
achieve the same effect.78 The originator must be licensed (protecting his initial investment), 
but offering protection to dependent technologies (new uses or new therapeutic effects) 
facilitates increased fields of competitors, maximising the potential for next generation 
                                                          
73
 EPC, Art 53(a); T315/03 HARVARD/Oncomouse [2006] OJ EPO 15; G2/06 and T1372/04 WARF/Use of 
Embryos [2009] EPOR 15; Case C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace [2011]ECR I-9821; Case C-364/13 
International Stem Cell Corp v Comptroller General of Patents [2014] Opinion of Advocate General 17 
July 2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1414505526856&uri= 
CELEX:62013CC0364  [2013] EWHC 807 ; T2221/10 TECHNION Culturing Stem Cells [2014] EPOR 23. 
74
 EPC, Art 53(c); G1/07 MEDI-PHYSICS/Treatment by Surgery [2010] EPOR 25; G2/08 ABBOTT 
RESPIRATORY/Dosage Regime [2010] EPOR 26; G1/07 and T245/87 SIEMENS/Flow Measurement 
[1989] 5 OJ EPO 171; G1/04 CYGNUS/Diagnostic Methods [2006] 5 OJ EPO 334 (respectively). 
75
  See Brüstle (n 73), distinctions based on potential for life and not objectifying embryos are very open to 
interpretation, undermining their moral legitimacy. 
76
  EPC, Art 54(4); T1020/03 Method of Administration of IGF-I/GENENTECH [2007] OJ EPO 204; G2/08 
(n 74). 
77
 EPC, Art 54(5) permitting 2nd/subsequent indications; G2/88 MOBIL/Friction Reducing Additive [1990] 
EPOR 73; T509/04 ALLERGAN (unreported), cited in UK-IPO Examination Guidelines, Examination 
Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Medical Inventions in the Intellectual Property Office (May 
2013), para 145 see T1020/03 (ibid) and in the UK: contra Merrell Dow v Norton [1996] RPC 73; Actavis 
v Janssen [2008] EWHC 1422; and EPO approach to selection inventions approved in 'U5HGG\¶Vv Eli 
Lilly [2010] RPC 9. 
78
  Depending on the interpretation of the Bolar/Research exemption, indications may infringe the originator if 
they do not obtain a licence (discussed at 4.1.4 below). 
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market exploitation to happen quicker. In effect, by rewarding innovatory effort on existing 
products (patented or not), the patent regulator can create new market potential from existing 
technology; proliferate that technology more widely in up-stream markets; which then 
quickens the pace of innovation. 
Problems arise with µfollow-on¶ medicines, sub-FDWHJRULVHG IRU FODULW\DV µPH-better 
WRRV¶DQGµPHWRRV¶, both of which are distinguished from generics as not being copies.  µMe-
better WRR¶ medicines offering no additional therapeutic value are generally the result of the 
µUDFHWRLQYHQW¶WKHRULJLQDWRU79 or attempts to invent around it once it has been patented. Any 
innovation only becomes protectable if it is sufficiently different from existing technology 
and, for me-better toos falling within the same class80 as the originator, this rests on achieving 
the same therapeutic benefit for the same use by a different means (eg targeted to a different 
active ingredient, DNA-sequence or protein product not disclosed by the originator). 81 The 
social value of me-better toos is that they may offer a clinical benefit: this can be crucial in 
developing pharmaceuticals where side-effects, contra-indications, building up resistance 
after frequent use, or adverse reactions to specific phenotypes may require different treatment 
options.  
Me toos on the other hand should be unpatentable because they offer nothing new: 
they merely re-claim the existing innovation. The difficulty of factually distinguishing a me-
better too from a me too is part of the reason why commentary is split on the value of follow-
ons.82 In a competitor, it is likely the patent holder will instigate infringement proceedings or 
challenge attempted patenting, but difficulties arise where it is the patent holder claiming a 
me too. This is because it can be extremely difficult to detect a me too on examination 
(particularly in the context of a biologic), there may be no competitors capable of bringing 
                                                          
79
  See: JA DiMasi and LB )DGHQµCompetitiveness in follow-on drug R&D: a race or imitation¶-DQXDU\
2011, 10(1) National Review of Drug Discovery 23. 
80
  Classification of medicines relies upon the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification System, which 
groups medicines in terms of their discrete biological systems within the body, therapeutic effect, 
pharmacological group, chemical family, specific chemical name and cross-referenced to its defined daily 
dosage: WHO Guidelines for ATC classification and DDD assignment (2013, as amended), www.whocc. 
no/filearchive/publications/ 1_2013guidelines.pdf. 
81
 They have either varied the product claimed or provided an equivalent technology beyond the scope of the 
originator patent. In the UK: Kirin-Amgen v Transkaryotic Therapies (No 2) [2005] RPC 9; PLG Research 
Ltd v Ardon International Ltd [1995] FSR 116; Kastner v Rizla Ltd [1995] RPC 585; Improver v Remington 
[1990] FSR 181;Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183. 
82
  J Cohen, L Cabanilla and J 6RVQRYµRole of follow-on drugs and indications on the WHO essential drug 
OLVW¶ Journal of Clinical Pharmacy and Therapeutics 585VHHDOVR5$%RXFKDUGHWDOµ7KH
Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and InnovatLRQ:KR¶V/HDGLQJ:KRP"¶Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 1461. 
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proceedings, and legal practitioners¶ UHSXWDWLRQV RIWHQKLQJHRQ the length of time they are 
DEOHWRµHYHUJUHHQ¶WKHLUFOLHQWV¶SURSULHWDU\ULJKts.83 
While patents allow innovation which is an alternative to originators with no 
requirement to be better, innovation development is primarily motivated by the potential for 
remuneration by healthcare payers. Within this selection process, the role of health 
technology assessments84 (HTAs) is central and these are focused on identifying value to 
justify cost.85 Even without remuneration decisions being directly µYDOXH-EDVHG¶86 clinical 
trials have become more frequently designed to demonstrate efficacy relative to a reference 
product (the currently funded in class),87 to maximise potential adoption. The limitations of 
patents to incentivise innovation is exemplified by antibiotic development, which until 
recently remained undeveloped largely because of the inability to demonstrate added value.88  
This suggests that regulatory bodies charged with goals directed to 
innovation/economic growth are hampered in achieving this aim, because they are only one 
of a number of regulatory bodies that affect growth. In this instance, it makes no difference 
that the patent system requires only difference, rather than advantage, because trials 
management is geared towards remuneration restrictions. Conversely, if the patent regulator 
is to be capable of achieving its economic goals, better mechanisms for identifying and 
preventing me toos are required and yet this is not being sought at present. 
 
Process patents 
                                                          
83
  For an example of attempted evergreening: Merrell Dow v Norton (n 77). 
84
  These assessments examine the social, economic and value of new medicines to advise healthcare 
commissioners and providers. 
85
  Eg in England, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) permit for a range of 
approaches to HTAs, but all are focused on benefits: http://publications.nice.org.uk/guide-to-the-methods-
of-technology-appraisal-2013-pmg9/the-reference-case and the introduction of the NHS Scorecard, ensures 
uniform adoption/proliferation of the innovations selected: www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/innovation/ 
innovation-scorecard/. 
86
  Intentions to introduce Value-Based Pricing in England in January 2014 on the back of the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012, were abandoned after receiving much criticism (eg B Arzymanow and J Manning, 
Value-based pricing: the wrong medicine for the nation? (Health 2020.org, 2013), www.2020health. 
org/dms/ 2020 health/.../reports/VBPReport_6-5-13.pdf. 
87
  Eg SJ 3RFRFNµThe pros and cons of non-LQIHULRULW\WULDOV¶Clinical Pharmacology 
Fundamental & Clinical Pharmacology 483; the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) Q10 Guidelines adopted by the 
(0$µ,&+JXLGHOLQH4RQSKDUPDFHXWLFDOTXDOLW\V\VWHP¶14 May 2014 (EMA/CHMP/ICH/214732/ 
2007), at 8 referenced to Q8, www. ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/ 
2009/09/WC500002871.pdf. 
88
  Westminster Health Policy Forum, µHealthcare innovation: medicines, technology, service delivery and 
regulation¶29th October 07UDQµCall for new generatioQRIDQWLELRWLFVWRILJKWRIIVXSHUEXJV¶
July 2014) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jul/02/call-new-generation-antiobiotics-
fight-superbugs. 
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Process patents are a far narrower form of protection in comparison with product per se 
protection, because (although they collaterally protect the product directly resulting from the 
process)89 infringement relies on use of the process. Generally more than one procedure 
results in any given medicine, so potential dangers are limited to ring-fencing where every 
GLVFHUQLEOHPHWKRGRIREWDLQLQJD µSODWIRUP¶90 medicine excludes competitors. Frequency is 
undocumented, but is likely to be rare. Product per se and process patents are generally 
claimed together and combined rights can cause a greater restrictive effect. 
 
Combining forms of protection 
Product per se and process patents on originators restrict unlicensed use of medicines fitting 
the patent claim and a small amount of improvement/diversification which falls within the 
original patent (eg APIs in the same chemical family originally claimed, products in capsule, 
liquid or double strength forms). Developing the originator to treat different conditions, 
where there is a clinical benefit or offering therapeutic value (even if it is only a better dosage 
regime), 91  can attract separate patent protection (subsequent indications), as can the 
development of novel manufacture or supply processes. 92  This enables innovation 
development to take as many routes as possible, resulting in different medicines or treatment 
options. Innovation spreads quickly, enhancing trade potential, but this benefit is diminished 
by: the confusion of purchasing decisions resulting from patents and licences; and the 
increase in competition (eg reducing the possibility for an originator patent owner WRµUHVHUYH
PDUNHWV¶ in subsequent indications).   
In an attempt to secure its goal (economic growth) by maximising market potential, 
the EPO gives the strongest protection to originators and changed its regulatory practices to 
promote protection of newly-valued medicines. In some respects the EPO is hampered in 
actually achieving growth, because it is only one of a number of regulatory bodies that affect 
innovation. This was exemplified by it making no difference that the patent system requires 
only difference, rather than advantage, because trials management is already geared towards 
remuneration restrictions. Understanding the justificatory role of market potential identifies 
that the patent regulator is not achieving its goals and to do so there must be: greater co-
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 See Unified Patent Court Agreement (n 68), Art 25(b) and (c); and eg UKPA, s60(1)(b) & (c); Pioneer 
Electronics v Warner Music [1997] RPC 757. 
90
  A technological leader in its field, discussed in 4.1.2 below. 
91
  G2/08 (n 74). 
92
  T958/94 Anti-tumoral Agent [1997] OJ EPO 241. 
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ordination between regulators; better mechanisms for identifying and preventing me toos; and 
more consideration of the collateral impacts of adopting specific regulatory practices. 
So while it is clear that the EPO regulates to maximise market potential in the hope 
that it will result in economic growth, the scope for actually securing economic growth must 
be considered relative to how much of the market can be secured by even the strongest 
patents. This requires an examination of other factors which affect market grab, specifically 
how the patent right sits in the technological field to which it relates and licensing rights, both 
of which are predominantly RXWVLGHRIWKHUHJXODWRU¶VFRQWURO 
 
4.1.2 Innovation relative to the technological field 
Irrespective of how strong the patent, its effect is reliant upon how much the innovation 
dominates a specific field of technology.  Any patent on a technological breakthrough has a 
restrictive effect, but it becomes µIRXQGDWLRQDO¶ZKHn it relates to a platform technology. This 
technology may be the first in a new field of innovation (eg monoclonal antibody technology 
or recombination), or the beginning of a broad/long chain of innovation.93 The fear is that 
foundational patents on platform technology create a bottleneck because access relies on 
licences.  Monoclonal antibody technology and recombination both began with a single 
breakthrough giving rise to entirely new scientific specialties, but only the initial innovation 
in recombination was patented. 94  So this goes some way towards dispelling myths that 
patents restrict technological development: patents may temporarily slow the pace of 
innovation by restricting initial access by requiring licenses, but in the long-term represent no 
numerical loss of development. Irrespective of how the chain of innovation diverges as it 
nears the point of end-use by consumers, without access to platform technology the best 
prospect for developing effective and non-toxic medical treatments may never exist. So this is 
a very high-stakes issue. 
This analysis demonstrates that regulators cannot totally control economic growth by 
regulating patents, because any restrictions on continuing technological development or 
market proliferation are commensurate with how difficult/how long rival and replacement 
innovations take to create. Even where rights cannot be circumvented, competitors (who were 
racing to the patent office, but were unable to achieve sufficient novelty) can become 
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  µ%URDG¶UHIHUULQJWRSDUDOOHOWHFKQRORJLHVZKLFKGHULYHIURPDVLQJOHRULJLQDWRUDQGKDYHPDQ\LPPHGLDWH
PDUNHWVµORQJ¶UHIerring to innovations which rely upon the previous step for development and progress 
towards a single end-market. 
94
 (J0&ODUNµ(PSRZHULQJWKHLQYHQWRU± WKHFDVHRIPRQRFORQDODQWLERGLHV¶Nature 
Biotechnology 1047. 
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potential licensees in the ensuing race to develop the next generation of innovation. So the 
economic value of the patent rests on its market grab and this is far more affected by how the 
innovation relates to other products in the market and dependence on licences, than on the 
strength of the patent.  
  
4.1.3 Restrictive effects on licences 
Licences can apply to innovations within the same generation (newly-valued medicines), or 
in the development of new generations where the licence follows the same chain of 
innovation (eg producing a diagnostic test kit following the development of a biologic).  
Innovation develRSPHQWLQWKHVDPHJHQHUDWLRQFDQUHVXOWLQµSDWHQWWKLFNHWV¶ZKHUHFORVHO\
related narrow patent ULJKWVDUHKHOGE\GLIIHUHQWRZQHUVRUµSDWHQWFOXVWHUV¶ZKHUHWKH\DUH
claimed by the same patent holder) and this can preclude marketing.  Where narrow rights are 
owned by the same innovator, it has the equivalent effect of claiming too broadly. µLicence 
VWDFNLQJ¶RYHUVXFFHVVLYHJHQHUDWLRQVFDQ jeopardise development by pricing innovation out 
of the market (the licensing fees being larger than returns on development), or by the sheer 
volume of rights (tracking down so many parties).95 This connection between legal patents 
and licensing is undeniably restrictive but, despite the terminological focus on patents, the 
absence of patents would not lessen licences. Instead restrictions would be based on 
commercial licences over trade secrecy, data/market exclusivity rights or centre on know-
how.96 
Short of being an industry standard, the cumulative effect of a plethora of 
patents/licences is the potential to dominate a particular medical research area or a market for 
a specific medical condition. It can also lead to self-competing, where a single 
pharmaceutical company markets: originator medicines that have fallen out of patent 
protection but retain brand-loyalty; self-generic versions to compete with generics from 
competitors; subsequent indications for treatment in closely related medical conditions; me-
better too medicines; and product delivery variations on the originator, indications and the 
me-better toos. While not all of these categories may be exploited conjointly, staggering 
PDUNHWHQWU\FDQH[WHQGWKHGXUDWLRQRIH[FOXVLYLW\)URPWKHFRQVXPHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH there is 
no expectation that four apparently competing medicines come from the same producer and 
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 (n 36). 
96
  Know-how relates to proprietorial information which relates to practical knowledge, such as what 
temperature tolerances new vaccines must be kept at to avoid becoming attenuated. 
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this creates scope for price fixing, which relies on regulation through competition law.97 Even 
where pricing does not amount to anti-competitive practices, the use of discount pricing, bulk 
offers and other normal retail tools confuse medicine purchasing decisions. 
The vast bulk of licensing patented technology is left to the industry to govern 
(compulsory licensing and licenses as of right being nominal regulatory interventions) and 
this shifts the restrictive effects of licenses away from patent regulation and onto the failure 
RIFRPSHWLWLRQODZWRSUHYHQWµVKDUSSUDFWLFHV¶ZKLFKGRQRWEUHDFKIRUPDOFRPSHWLWLRQUXOHV
The European Commission is already committed to increasing competition law scrutiny,98 
and practices falling short of the rules,99 but monitoring and enforcement is intended to be a 
co-RSHUDWLYHHQGHDYRXUEHWZHHQWKHLQGXVWU\µPDUNHWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DQGUHJXODWRUV100 There is 
QR HYLGHQFH WKDW µPDUNHW SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ ZDV HYHU LQWHQGed to mean the patient groups, 
commissioners and doctors included in the consultation prior to the 2009 Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry.101  This indicates that regulation is firmly prioritising competitive market 
considerations over collateral economic or social concerns that may relate to the selection of 
health targets, cost-efficiencies or marketing strategies that may be of interest to the groups 
excluded from the regulatory process. 
Enabling a patent holder to control subsequent innovation in the same field can be 
justified by the fact that ensuing developments inherently rely upon the original contribution 
for their existence. The patent holder is usually in the best position (as the leader in the field) 
to exploit the development most effectively and speedily (eg having the manpower and 
know-how, or in identifying licensees). Conversely, developing the originator medicine for 
unrelated medical contexts is far less likely to be carried out by the patent holder (their field 
of expertise being determined by existing manpower, the potential to buy-in expertise as 
needed and existing marketing networks). This is not a result of the size of the R&D 
                                                          
97
 Unfair competitive practices: TFEU, Article 101; eg T77/08 Dow Chemical Co v EC [2012] 4 CMLR 19; 
or dominant market position under TFEU, Article 102; Case C-457/10 AstraZeneca v EC [2013] 4 
C.M.L.R. 7, or other dubious trading practices such as paying generic competitors to stay out of the 
market: Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v Commission [2013] EU Focus 310, 8-9; on appeal C-325/76 [2013]. 
98
  See Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report (n 32), p522; European Commission, The 4th Report on the 
monitoring of patent settlements (January-December 2012), http://ec.europa. 
eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/. 
99
  See Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report (n 32) p524. 
100
  See Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report (n 32) p524-525. 
101
  The Patent Settlement and Antitrust monitoring reports that have been issued since the Sector Inquiry 
certainly support this reading, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ pharmaceuticals/inquiry/. 
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enterprise, as even large pharmaceutical companies need to out-source or license further 
development as medical innovation becomes increasingly specialised and costly.102  
Permitting indications with therapeutic benefits, encouraging off label uses103 to be 
brought within the scope of formal protection, and facilitating me-better too medicines as 
clinical alternatives demonstrates that patent regulation nurtures dependent innovation. This 
secures the widest saturation of innovation. Promoting development of clinical alternatives 
can be inhibited post-patent and creation rests on introducing specific incentive schemes, or 
changing the selection criteria for healthcare remuneration. Undetectable me toos, which are 
against HYHU\RQHEXW WKH ULJKWKROGHUV¶ interests, are the cost of maximising the potential of 
newly-valued medicines. Far more of the restrictive effect of innovation ownership is 
incidental to the patent right, because it emanates from the right relative to the existing 
technology in the market and this is an aspect which is beyond the control of regulators and 
industry; or it emanates from licensing, and regulators are only beginning to respond to the 
reality of market practices. This requires a focus on activities that fall outside traditional 
concepts of unfair competitive practice and market dominance definitions (eg paying 
competitors not to produce generics). Regulating market growth transcends a single regulator 
and necessitates oversight of: all forms of marketing; product liability beyond manufacturing 
failure; as well as regulating anti-competitive practices. This demonstrates that patent 
regulators on their own have a very limited potential to actually achieve the policy goals they 
are intended to work towards.  
If goal-achievement is the focus of regulatory efforts, recent initiatives would be on 
facilitating economic growth by: properly policing me toos, preventing their unwarranted 
exclusivity; bringing licensing within the regulatory sphere; and co-ordinating the efforts of 
different regulators. Instead, what is achieved is entirely in line with maximising market 
potential by: providing strong product rights (supporting R&D); introducing lowered novelty 
thresholds (expanding R&D proliferation, but diluting rights in the market); and facilitating a 
broader range of follow-on patents (warranted or not, supporting newly-value medicines) in 
order to encourage market proliferation. These changes can only hope to yield greater 
economic growth, but they fall short of being able to ensure it.  
                                                          
102
 See Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report (n 32); WHO Commission Report, Public Health: innovation 
and intellectual property rights (WHO, 2006). 
103
  Meaning use of an originator for a medical purpose not identified in clinical trials, or authorised for market 
use (protectable as indications: having the same therapeutic benefit, used in a new treatment context). 
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Beyond the effect of the patent itself, patent regulators utilise other mechanisms to 
encourage the proliferation of technology. A fundamental mechanism 104  is the research 
exemption, which enables regulators to balance existing rights/market shares with supporting 
the development of competitors who may be developing competing products, generics or the 
next generation of innovations. 
  
4.1.4 Falling within the research exemption  
Concerns regarding the restrictive effects of patent rights often relate to the potential to 
prevent further medical research. To ameliorate the possibility of inhibiting the proliferation 
of medicines and in an effort to harmonize existing domestic research exemptions, the EU 
introduced the Bolar exemption.105 This laid down a minimum requirement that Member 
States exempt from infringement the use of proprietary medicines in obtaining market 
authorisation for generics.106  This clearly includes biosimilars with bioequivalence which do 
not require additional testing. 107  What is less clear is what else may fall within this 
exemption. Does it include testing: combination medicines; combination advanced 
therapies;108 new therapeutic value for existing medicines, or obtaining information for public 
health reasons?109 Are activities other than testing (such as manufacture, supply and importation) 
also within the scope of the exemption? Does it make a difference if the tests are conducted by a 
third party to the market authorisation, such as a clinical research organisation (CROs)? Could it 
include the HTAs which run in tandem with the market authorisation procedure within Member 
States? 
 In consequence of the lack of detail and the scope to provide more protection, Member 
6WDWHV¶ Bolar/research exemptions are individualised, but categorise into broad or narrow.110 
Germany exemplifies a broad interpretation, capturing any experimental activities with a 
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 For more see (n 21). 
105
 Directive 2004/27/EC amending Directive 2001/83/EC (2004) OJ L136/34, importing a new Article 10(6) 
into Directive 2001/83/EC. 
106
  See Unified Patent Court Agreement (n 68), Art 27(b), UKPA, s60(5)(i)(i). 
107
  Therapeutic or Bioequivalence mean the generic/biosimilar medicines (respectively) perform in the same 
way as the originator. For generics this relies on having the same active ingredient, but combinations may 
require additional testing as will some biosimilars (eg resulting from unreliable targeting, lack of interface 
with regulatory regions, normal errors in transcription).  This latter point is the reason the EMA introduced 
specific guidelines: Directive 2004/27/EC (n 105), introducing a new Article 10(2)(b) into Directive 
2001/83/EC, listing general and specific scientific guidelines for biosimilars.  
108
  Combination medicines are those with more than one active ingredient. Analogously this translates to 
biologics with more than one sequence target/cellular product, and in the context of advanced therapies 
(such as stem cells and human tissue) refers to the combination of biological and manufactured materials. 
109
 UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO), The Research and Bolar Exemptions: An informal consultation 
on patent infringement in pharmaceutical clinical and field trials (HMSO, 2011). 
110
  For more detail, see: L Cohen and L Peirson, µ7KH8.UHVHDUFKDQGµ%RODU¶H[HPSWLRQV: broadening the 
VFRSHIRULQQRYDWLRQ"¶Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 837. 
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patented medicine, irrespective of whether it is commercial, and including clinical trials to 
obtain market authorisation for indications or a generic.111 
 Traditionally, the UK exemplified the narrow interpretation. The research exemption 
which pre-dated the Bolar exemption in Europe distinguished between testing and discovery 
(within the exemption) and merely confirming or seeking market authorisation (as falling 
outside). 112  This latter aspect was amended in the context of originator medicines to 
accommodate the EU Bolar exemption, which was construed narrowly to exclude activities 
relating to market authorisation of indications, but allowing any activities necessary to obtaining 
market authorisation of generics (including manufacture, import and supply of samples).113 
Arguably research tools (defined as the use of protected products µRQDQRWKHULQYHQWLRQ¶ were 
excluded from the exemption.114 In the context of stem cells, the limitations on patenting stem 
cells per se means that future patents are likely to be claimed by reference to the cells into which 
stem cells can be specialised RU WKHLU VSHFLDOLVDWLRQ DV µIDFWRU\¶ FHOOV IRU FOLQLFDO WULDOs . This 
brings stem cells within the definition of research tools where they are not being used for direct 
therapeutic benefit on patients: so research tool stem cells fall outside of the research exemption. 
This interpretation is supported by the enduring construction of exemptions as allowing 
activities which do not impinge upon marketability. For research tools the interim research 
market is their end market, so an exemption which includes such tools would have the effect of 
stopping them from being developed or traded. Suggestions that the Bolar exemption should 
include research tools (because it is intended to expedite generic entry and rights over tools can 
delay this) 115 are undermined by the range of tools generally available which has the effect of 
reducing fees (eg the licensing fees are considerably cheaper than those for originator 
medicines), and tools without rights which can easily be copied will cease to be developed. 
 The UK Legislative Reform (Patents) Order 2014116 changed the pre-existing protection 
of market value and introduced supplementary provisions which broaden the exemption 
considerably. As such it represents an example of legislative measures being introduced to 
maximise market potential, because it facilitates generics reaching the market more quickly. The 
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  Clinical Trials I [1997] RPC 623; Clinical Trials II [1998] RPC 423 (respectively). 
112
  See Unified Patent Court Agreement (n 68), Art 27(d); UKPA, s60(5)(b); Monsanto v Stauffer Chemical 
Co [1985] RPC 515, para 3. 
113
  UKIPO Guidance on the Bolar exemption, www.ipo.gov.uk/p-policy-pharmaceutical.htm; Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) Guidance, www.mhra.gov.uk/home/groups/comms-
ic/documents/website resources/con007679.pdf. 
114
 Smith, Kline and French v Evans Medical [1989] FSR 513; MHRA Guidance (ibid); UKIPO, The Patent 
Research Exemption: A consultation (HMSO, 2008) 5; UKIPO Guidance (ibid). 
115
  (n 110) p842. 
116
  HMSO, implemented on 1 October 2014, www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukdsi/2014/9780111114537. 
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stated intention of the measure is to remove barriers to conducting clinical trials in the UK 
(making innovation more likely to be patented and marketed here first) and lessening the burden 
of litigation on industry (speeding up market entry for generics and dependent technology).117 
The main provision, in addition to the existing research exemption, stipulates WKDW µanything 
done in or for the purposes of a medicinal product assessment«is to be regarded as done for 
experimental purposes¶.118 This is an extremely broad approach to activities and, in tandem 
with the following provision extends the exemption to trials for indications.119 The context of 
testing is extended from the market authorisation already permitted by the Bolar exemption 
to include HTAs and regulatory requirements necessary for market entry that may 
additionally apply and this is irrespective of whether it occurs in the UK or abroad. 120 The 
changes adopt a broad interpretation of medicinal products, including originator medicines, 
combination medicines, advanced therapies, and combination advanced therapies. 121  The 
absence of stipulations on whose activities are exempt suggests that it extends to CROs, but 
this is open to debate. Whether third party supply of active ingredients is covered by the 
Bolar exemption is a question that was referred to the CJEU by the German Court of 
Appeal,122  but has since been withdrawn and so a prime opportunity for clarification has 
been missed. 
 These UK provisions undoubtedly benefit the development and access to the market 
of competitors developing their own originators (eg facilitating inclusion of existing 
originators in trials as comparators) and newly-valued medicines. These changes mean that 
generics/biosimilars (irrespective of whether they additionally require trials to demonstrate 
equivalence) and copies of advanced therapies will be able to put authorisation in place, 
ready for market entry as soon as the patent/SPC or data/market exclusivity period expires. 
This clearly serves the need for faster access to markets of generics that market potential 
identifies. Mediating between researchers (wanting access to products/processes) and patent 
holders (preserving the value of patent rights where researchers are the end-market) is incredibly 
difficult. In the UK, clearly the balance has changed radically in widening the research 
exemption in line with maximising market potential. 
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  Impact Assessment No 142 (2014), www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/ 2014/9780111114537/impacts. 
118
  (n 116) including a new sub-section 6D into UKPA s60.  
119
  (n 116) sub-section 6E. 
120
  Ibid. 
121
  (n 116) sub-section 6F. 
122
  Polypharma Pharmaceutical Works v Astellas Pharma [2014], https://docs. google.com/viewer?a=v&pid= 
sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxwYWxpdGNhc2VzfGd4OjEwM2Q1ZDUxOGVhOWM2N2I. 
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 It is unfortunate that the new provisions do not clarify that research tools fall outside of 
the exemption. The reality at present is that many pharmaceutical companies waste money 
obtaining legal advice to ensure they are within the research exemption, and  smaller companies 
simply ignore the potential for liability and hope not to get caught infringing.  The new 
provisions in the UK will at least allay some of these fears, but mediating these concerns could 
be served by far better educational and advice mechanisms in preference to just widening the 
exemption and creating new boundaries of uncertainty. 
 
 Pan-(XURSHDQDQG LQGLYLGXDOQDWLRQV¶ patent regulators are focused on justifying their 
behaviour relative to the goals set for them, evidenced by practices which closely match market 
potential. Within this analysis it is clear that regulating activities beyond market potential is not 
being carried out and neither is there any perceived effort to expand competencies to regulate 
behaviours (eg licensing) which have a far more direct impact on the market proliferation of 
technology, giving regulators greater potential to achieve economic growth. This supports the 
assertion that the EPO and its network of Member States¶ patent offices, the European Appeal 
Boards DQG 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ OHJLVODWLYH PHDVXUHs all regulate towards the same justificatory 
approach. While these are contextually linked bodies, the question becomes whether the same 
justificatory behaviour is evident amongst less closely related and unrelated institutions 
regulating modern medicines. 
    
4.2 The CJEU 
This part of the analysis assesses two aspects of the CJEU ± regulating trade in medicines and 
regulating rights over the development of medicines - to identify that the same justificatory 
basis as that adopted by the EPO is being replicated by judicial regulators. 
 
4.2.1 The CJEU moving away from entrenched EU policies 
While the overarching policy of the EU relates to promoting the µHFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO
SURJUHVV¶123 of its Member States, an inherent part of this has been devoted to ensuring the 
free movement of goods,124 that can only be departed from on justified grounds125 which do 
not discriminate against traders simply because there are existing commercial rights.126 
                                                          
123
  Preamble, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (Consolidated Version), (26.10.2012) OJ EU 
C326/47-390. 
124
  TFEU Arts 34 and 35. 
125
  TFEU, Art 36. 
126
  TFEU, Art 37. 
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 In practice, this has led to the creation of a new type of competitor for the 
pharmaceutical industryDµSDUDOOHOLPSRUWHU¶ZKROHJLWLPDWHO\SXUFKDVHVSDWHQWed medicines 
from markets in one EU country and imports them into another country to sell in competition 
with the patent holder (the originator producer or his licensee). This presents a problem for 
the patent holder, because the parallel importer is able to undermine his market share by 
either under-cutting the retail price, or offering the medicine in a more marketable form (eg 
packaged more conveniently for consumers). Importing for resale outside of the EU, the 
SDUDOOHO LPSRUWHU¶V µVKDGRZ¶PHGLFLQHV LQIringe the patent right and the importer is legally 
liable. Within the EU, commitment to the free movement of goods between Member States127 
PHDQV WKDW WKH SDWHQWV RYHU WKH WDQJLEOH UHVDOH SURGXFWV KDYH EHHQ µH[KDXVWHG¶/must be 
µDGMXVWHG¶ by the first sale to the parallel importer.128 This acts as a defence against activities 
which would otherwise infringe. In recognising that the patent holder retains an interest in 
protecting the goodwill he has built up in selling his medicines to consumers, the parallel 
importer only becomes liable: if his trade results in diminishing the reputation of the patent 
holder;129 or for repackaging,130 rebranding,131 or relabelling132 medicines detrimentally to the 
interests of the patent holder or adversely affecting the free movement of goods. 133 
Enabling a parallel importer to legitimately trade patented medicines should 
discourage the patent holder from charging widely disparate prices for the same medicine 
based on what different EU markets can bear. The problem is that the lower prices are often 
the result of governments artificially depressing reimbursement prices.134 The consequence is 
that pharmaceutical companies look to countries where they are able to dictate prices (such as 
                                                          
127
 Notably the exception in Art WRµWKHKHDOWK and life of humans rank first among the property or interests 
SURWHFWHG¶, Case C-104/75 De Peijper  [1976] ECR 613, but must not be limited to protecting domestic 
interests and must be proven: Case C-319/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-9811; Case C-270/02 
Commission v Italy [2004] ECR 1559; and imported into the Unitary Patent on the proviso that it is subject 
to valid reasons for opposing market proliferation (eg market recall on safety grounds): Regulation 
1257/2012/EC (n 34), Art 6; Unified Patent Court Agreement (n 68), Art 29 (the Unitary Patent taking effect 
when the UPC Agreement is ratified by 13 Member States including the UK, Germany and France). 
128
 ibid, TFEU, Art 37; Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v Metro-SB-Grossmärkte [1971] ECR 487; 
Terrapin v Terranova [1976] 2 CMLR 482.  
129
 Case C-276/05 Wellcome Foundation v Paranova  Pharmazeutika Handels  [2008] ECR I-10479; Dansk 
Supermarked v Imerco [1981] ECR 181; Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1998] 5 RPC 166. 
130
 Boehringer Ingelheim v Dowelhurst Ltd [2002] FSR 61, [2004] EuLR 757; Loendersloot v Ballantine & Son 
[1998] FSR 544; Bristol-Myers Squibb v Paranova [1997] FSR 102. 
131
 American Home Products v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1823. 
132
 Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim v Swingward  [2008] All ER (EC) 411; Glaxo Group v Dowelhurst 
Ltd (No 2) [2000] FSR 529; Loendersloot v Ballantine & Son [1998] FSR 544. 
133
 Technically this included importing a product in order to develop a generic for market authorisation using 
a patented medicine (even if legitimately purchased) (Generics BV v Smith Kline & French Labs [1997] 22 
RPC 801), but the Bolar exemption arguably removed this. 
134
 For an analysis of how healthcare pricing can maximise public interest see: L Ho, Health Policy and the 
Public Interest (Routledge, 2012).  
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the UK where prices are capped relative to a percentage profit calculation, incentivising the 
industry to inflate costs) 135  to recoup investment in R&D. Parallel imports should also 
discourage patent holders varying the quantities of specific medicines which can be 
SXUFKDVHGEXWDJDLQWKLVLVRIWHQUHTXLUHGE\LQGLYLGXDO0HPEHU6WDWHV¶UHJXODWLRQV136 This 
leaves patent holders with no means of reducing the potential for parallel traders to erode 
their profits.  
The rationale of the EU is that legitimising parallel trade enhances access to 
medicines by creating secondary markets promoting price competition and ensuring sufficient 
supplies to meet demand in the country the medicines are imported into. Although the 
SDWHQW¶V YDOXH LV UHWDLQHG E\ WKH ILUVW VDOH WR WKH SDrallel importer, parallel importation 
demonstrably creates shortages as supplies gravitate to countries offering the highest sales 
profit. 137  Recognising this detrimental effect and the up-scaling of parallel trade from 
LQGHSHQGHQW WUDGHUV WR ZKROHVDOHUV µFRPSHWLQJ¶ ZLWK WKH YHU\ SURGXFHUV ZKR VXSSO\ WKHP
prompted the CJEU to go against accepted policy which supports parallel trade. The CJEU 
instead supported the patent holders even in the context of anticompetitive practices and 
being in dominant market positions.138  
Pharmaceutical companies such as GSK are advocating a dual pricing regime that 
would discriminate against parallel traders without success as yet,139 but this may simply be a 
matter of time in light of the All-Party Pharmacy Group (APPG) report calling for 
                                                          
135
  Intentions to introduce Value-Based Pricing with the implementation of the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 have been replaced by another five year agreement between the Department of Health (DoH) and the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) which enables the industry to set its own prices 
subject to a percentage profit cap and spend-to-cost restrictions (see: DoH, ABPI, The Pharmaceutical 
Price Regulation Scheme 2014 (December 2013), www.gov.uk/government/publications/pharmaceutical-
price-regulation-scheme-2014, point 6.1 in particular and n 86). For evidence of the inflation see: DW 
/LJKWDQG5:DUEXUWRQµ'HP\WKRORJL]LQJWKH+LJK&RVWVRI3KDUPDFHXWLFDO5HVHDUFK¶
BioSocieties 34-50. 
136
  Eg in the UK the Medicines (Sale or Supply) (Miscellaneous Provisions) Amendment (No. 2) Regulations 
1997, SI 1997/2045 prevents the general sale of paracetamol in packages of more than 16 tables. 
137
  All-Party Pharmacy Group (APPG), Report of the APPG Inquiry into Medicines Shortages (2012) APPG, 
www.appg.org.uk; F /LEHUDWRUHµUK calls for ban for parallel trade of prescription medicines ± what are 
the E8FRPSHWLWLRQODZLPSOLFDWLRQV"¶European Competition Law Review 189. 
138
   (Joining C-2/01 and C-3/01) Bayer Adalat case [2004] ECR I-23 the CJEU ruled that a non-dominant 
pharmaceutical company is not caught by unfair competitive practices (TFEU, Article 101) measures by 
unilaterally imposing trade conditions on a wholesaler which indirectly amounted to preventing export of 
medicines in parallel to their subsidiaries; and Case C-53/03 Syfait v GlaxoSmithKline [2005] ECR I-4609 
extending this ruling to cover dominant pharmaceutical companies (TFEU, Article 102), in this case 
refusing to supply to a wholesaler in order to prevent parallel trade because it would reduce domestic 
supply. 
139
  Case T-168/01 GSK v Commission [2006] (unreported); Case C-501/06 [2010] 2 CMLR 10, remitted back 
to the Commission to consider if imposing price differentials to inhibit parallel trade comes within TFEU, 
Art 101(3) exempting restrictive practices which contribute µto improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit¶ 
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prescription medicines to be protected from parallel trade.140 Any type of medicine is too 
important to be arbitrarily subject to free movement which is recklessly untied to market 
demand. This argues that patents, which are traditionally considered exclusionary, may 
become the mechanism ensuring domestic supply of medicines.  
Yet it is undeniable that the absence of a secondary sales market removes incentives 
for producers to lower their prices. Collaterally this can increase health tourism, particularly 
in neighbouring countries with wide price disparities. Neither can this be entirely off-set by 
self-regulation through the public choosing not to purchase. Even general sale medicines are 
QRW VWULFWO\ µFKRLFH SXUFKDVHV¶ D SODVWHU LV QRW Dn essential purchase but risk of infection 
(however minimal) urges it.  
This analysis exemplifies that the CJEU has breached existing EU policies in order to 
maximise market potential by helping to ensure that secondary sales markets do not 
undermine supply, creating surpluses and shortages in different Member States. This supports 
a regulatory focus on market maximisation rather than economic growth, because it 
prioritises availability of products at the expense of affordability. Arguably this is another 
instance of regulators not being sufficiently empowered, as regulating prices effectively in 
this context should more obviously be a matter of trade tariff agreements imposing import 
duties than judicial decisions imposing arbitrary penalties on individuals. Does the CJEU 
similarly adopt a market potential approach in enforcing proprietary rights collateral to 
patents? 
 
4.2.2 The CJEU expanding exclusionary rights 
Extending the duration of patent rights to medicines, which have not already been the subject 
of a Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC),141 with an additional period of exclusivity is 
generally considered to limit access to generics by delaying their market entry. The 
justification is that the time given is directly proportionate to the time lost between patent 
grant and marketing authorisation.142 This is enforced strictly, as evidenced by AstraZeneca 
v. Comptroller of Patents,143 in which the duration of protection was calculated relative to the 
first grant of market authorisation, irrespective of central EMA authorisation having been 
                                                          
140
  See APPG Report, 2012 (n 137). 
141
 Administered territorially through Member States: Regulation 469/2009/EC concerning the supplementary 
certificate for medicinal products (2009) L152 OJ EC 1-10, Art 3(c). 
142
  Minus five years and up to a maximum of 5 years: ibid, Art 13. 
143
  AstraZeneca v Comptroller of Patents [2012] EWHC 2840 confirmed by the CJEU: Case C-617/12 [2014] 
C102 OJ 8. 
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withheld and the first authorisation subsequently being withdrawn (both of which delayed its 
eventual market entry).  
 While this appears to run counter to regulating to maximise markets, the introduction 
of the European Regulation on SPCs has been followed by a plethora of decisions from the 
CJEU on referrals from Member States,144 expanding SPC protection beyond originators. 
Protection includes new uses of known active ingredients (indications and combinations), 
provided they fall within the original claim (implicitly if not explicitly) which was subject to 
patent rights when the first market authorisation was applied for and seemingly irrespective 
of who owns the originator product or the market authorisation.145 The rationale is that µthe 
fundamental objective of the SPC Regulation is to ensure sufficient protection to encourage 
pharmaceutical research, which plays a decisive role in the continuing improvement in public 
KHDOWK¶,146 and this is interpreted as protecting the investment expended in identifying new 
value in existing active ingredients. So market potential is clearly a motive in the changing 
judicial regulation of SPCs, even though an important limitation to the extension of SPCs is 
that combinations will not be accorded separate certificates where they do not represent 
distinct technical advances147 under the patent.148 These changes replicate the increased scope 
for patenting new indications and combinations into an ability to extend the rights to them 
(patents, SPCs, data and market exclusivity) so that they expire long after marketing. Hinging 
SPC SURWHFWLRQ DURXQG ZKHWKHU WKH µVROH VXEMHFW-PDWWHU¶149  of the original invention has 
DOUHDG\EHHQJLYHQSURWHFWLRQDWOHDVWSUHYHQWVWKHULVNRIµVWDFNLQJ¶63&VRQPHWRRV In the 
long-term there is a risk that the industry will be motivated to fragment the innovation claims, 
submitting multiple patent applications rather than multiple claims in a single application.150 
 The reliance upon the pharmaceutical industry to submit to formal regulatory 
requirements which are not independently policed is a key facet of SPCs.  Regulators work in 
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 (n 141) in the courts eg Case C-631/13 Arne Forsgren v Österreichisches Patentamt [2015] ECR 0; Case 
C-484/12 Georgetown University v Octrooicentrum Nederland [2013] WLR(D) 487; C-130/11 Neurim 
Pharma v Comptroller of Patents [2013] RPC 23; Case C-574/11 Novartis AG v Actavis Deutschland 
[2012] C133 OJ 13; Case C-442/11 Novartis AG v Actavis UK Ltd [2012] C133 OJ 12; Case C-6/11 
Daiichi Sankyo Company v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks [2012] C73 OJ 10.  
145
 See C-130/11 (ibid), and Case C-493/12 Eli Lilly v HGS [2013]; [2014] EWHC 2404 (Pat).  
146
 See C-130/11 (n 144) point 22, reaffirming the SPC Regulation (n 141, Recital 2). 
147
  Unity of invention resolves this issue (EPC, Art 82; G2/92 Non-payment of further search fees [1993] OJ 
EPO 591), but this relies upon a new technical effect which would not be an obvious variation of the 
central innovation in the patent. 
148
  Case C-443/12 Actavis v Sanofi [2014] C 52 OJ 30. 
149
  Case C-577/13 Actavis v Boehringer [2015]  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=162830&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=311680, 
confirming Case-C443/12, ibid. 
150
  This could result in provisions governing the unity of invention (EPC, Art 82 and Rule 44) being used by 
examiners to counter this, rather than its current value as a tool for applicants. 
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isolation without co-ordination with other bodies151 granting SPCs, licensing market entry 
and enforcing against anti-competitive practices, and the lack of co-ordination between 
different regulators is clearly being taken advantage of by the industry. Examples of 
regulatory abuse are rife. Astra Zeneca lost its challenge against the ¼52.2m fine imposed by 
the European Commission 152  for abusing the SPC system in order to prevent generic 
competitors entering the market. Neither is this just a trail of litigation at the European level, 
as demonstrated by the ,WDOLDQ &RXQFLO RI 6WDWH¶V UHFHQW GHFLVLRQ WR UHLQVWDWH WKH GHFLVLRQ
holding Pfizer liable for abusing a legally obtained SPC to keep out generics. 153 Utilising 
SPCs aggressively to limit competitors are not the only forms of abuse: supplying misleading 
information about dates to obtain the SPC in the first place is only one example of 
competitive tactics. 154  In the USA, *6.¶V UHFRUG $3b fine demonstrates that abuse of 
regulatory mechanisms also extends to providing misleading information about safety and 
pricing in order to obtain a market advantage.155 The same company also faced $490m fines 
and suspended prison sentences for executives over an alleged £320m of bribes to Chinese 
officials and healthcare providers to secure market share and charge higher unit costs.156 It is 
GHPRQVWUDWLYH RI UHJXODWRU\ LQWHQW WKDW ZKLOH (XURSHDQ DQG 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ FRPSHWLWLRQ
regulators are increasingly enforcing against such conduct where it limits the potential for 
generics (maximising a market potential), greater emphasis upon regulating between 
competences has not been targeted. 
 SPCs are not intrinsically restrictive other than being designed to extend patent rights 
which have been expended during clinical trials: so there is no loss of public access. It is also 
notable that, while SPCs are regulated through the patent system, they are regarded as part of 
an administrative process in contrast to the legal nature of patent regulation, but these SPC 
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  Even where there are co-operative analyses between regulatory bodies, which recognise the synergies in 
forms of regulating, there is no real drive to co-ordinate activities more effectively: WTO, WIPO, WHO 
Trilateral Report, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: intersections between public 
health, intellectual property and trade (2012), www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/global_ 
challenges/628/wipo_pub_628.pdf ; for an analysis of network theory relative to European patents see: S 
Borrás, The governance RIWKH(XURSHDQ3DWHQW6\VWHPHIIHFWLYHDQGOHJLWLPDWH"¶Economy 
and Society 594-610. 
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  Case C-457/10 AstraZeneca v Commission [2013] C26 OJ 2. 
153
  Case 7467/2012 Pfizer v Italian Competition Authority [2014] N 00116/2014 Reg.Prov.Coll; for more see 
$6SLOOPDQµ7UDQVSDUHQF\2EOLJDWLRQIRU+ROGHUVRI(8,3$VVHWVLQWKH3KDUPDFHXWLFDO,QGXVWU\¶
9(2) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 125. 
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 /+RZDUG*HQHULFVZHEµ6WUDWHJLF8VHRI6XSSOHPHQWDU\3URWHFWLRQ&HUWLILFDWHV3DUW¶ (2010) 7 
Journal of Generic Medicines 294. 
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 'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFHµGlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations 
anG)DLOXUHWR5HSRUW6DIHW\'DWD¶ 2 July 2012, www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 2012/July/12-civ-842.html. 
156
  %%&1HZVµ*OD[R6PLWK.OLQHILQHGPE\&KLQDIRUEULEHU\¶6HSWHPEHU
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29274822; D Roland, µGSK bribery scandal could cause 'irreparable 
damage', says China¶-XO\The Telegraph. 
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extensions have emanated from the CJEU. Both patents and SPCs have clearly expanded to 
accommodate a need to create more originators (including dependent technologies) and, 
excessive rights extending to me toos at patent grant are curbed within the SPC process, 
limiting the time that generics will be held out of the market. This is precisely the same 
profile that existing market potential identifies, enabling the patent, SPC and CJEU to justify 
their actions on the basis of facilitating economic growth. 
 The failure is that regulation is not effectively co-ordinated to prevent individual 
innovators obtaining more exclusivity than is warranted, or for a holistic approach to 
regulating industry. In focusing upon the market potential of an SPC in shepherding new 
combinations and newly-valued medicines to market, European regulators enable the industry 
to fragment medical products that will eventually saturate the market with nearly 
indistinguishable alternatives. In normal competitive markets this would result in a price war, 
but the reimbursement policies which attend medicines marketing frustrate this potential 
benefit. 
 All of the regulators so far assessed are arguably all attendant to the patent right, 
providing a possible reason for their behaviour conforming to the same rationality. So is the 
EMA, governing market entry, similarly focused on the same market potential as the patent 
system? 
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4.3  The EMA 
4.3.1 Facilitating generic entry  
There is no doubt that the EU Commission157 and the EMA158 are committed to promoting a 
robust generics market with early entry promoting access. This is demonstrated by generic 
medicines being able to fast-track market authorisation159 once the patent term has expired, to 
speed up market entry.160  Yet data/market exclusivity restrict market entry,161  commonly 
outlasting all other rights and making it a source of criticism. 162  After 8 years, 
generics/biosimilars can be applied for, but it is another 2 years before they gain market 
entry. This is not based on timelines for submitting applications, because 2 years is too long 
in the case of most SMCs/some biosimilars and too short for many biosimilars. 163 
Mechanisms designed to protect the R&D investment of originator medicines should 
correlate to a profit margin:164 a blanket duration (irrespective of type of innovation) creates a 
system which rewards scrimping on R&D or encourages extra R&D costs to unnecessarily 
inflate the prices charged to the consumer. 
 Once market authorisation has been granted to the originator, data exclusivity requires 
a balance between: (1) disclosure in the public interest for safety and the validity of public 
decision-making; 165 and (2) non-disclosure of proprietorial information that is commercially 
valuable.166 7KH(0$¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKH(8¶Vfocus on transparency167 resulted in policy 
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 3KDUPDFHXWLFDO6HFWRU,QTXLU\QDQGVLQFHRQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VIROORZXShttp://ec.europa. 
eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/ inquiry/. 
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 (ns 40 and 41), points 3.3 and 5.2.1. 
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 Directive 2001/83/EC (as amended) on the community code relating to medicinal products for human use 
[2001] OJ L311/67 ; Regulation 726/2004/EC (n 17); Regulation 658/2007/EC (as amended) concerning 
financial penalties for infringement of certain obligations in connection with marketing authorisations 
[2007] OJ L155/10; Regulation 507/2006/EC on the conditional marketing authorisation for medicinal 
products for human use [2006] OJ L92/6; and Regulation 2049/2005/EC rules regarding the payment of 
fees to, and the receipt of administrative assistance from, the European Medicines Agency by micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises [2005] OJ L329/4.  
160
  Fast-WUDFNLQJUHVWVRQµSLJJ\EDFNLQJ¶WKHJHQHULFPHGLFLQH¶VPDUNHWDXWKRULVDWLRQSURFHGXUHRQWKHVDIHW\
quality and efficacy data originally submitted to the EMA for the originator medicine. 
161
 8 years data exclusivity; 2 years market exclusivity (10 years consecutively); and an additional year if a 
new indication has been identified in the first 8 years: Directive 2004/27/EC (n 105); Regulation 
726/2004/EC (n 17) Art 14(11). 
162
  (J3$QGDQGDµ0DQDJLQJLQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\ULJKWVRYHUFOLQLFDOWULDOGDWDWRSURPRWHDFFHVVDQGEHQHILW
VKDULQJLQSXEOLFKHDOWK¶International Review of Intellectual Property & Competition Law 
140; S Matilal, µDo developing countries need a pharmaceutical data-H[FOXVLYLW\UHJLPH"¶
European Intellectual Property Review 268.  
163
 Timelines relate to harmonisation. Individual Member States variously provided 6 and 10 years data 
exclusivity: European Generics Medicines Association, Data Exclusivity (2004), www.egagenerics.com/ 
gen-dataex.htm. 
164
  Break-even is the point at which outlays and revenue balance each other, enabling all other revenue to be 
profit: for a SMC break-even will occur much earlier during marketing than for a biologic, because its 
R&D costs will be much lower. 
165
  Eg results of clinical and non-clinical trials. 
166
  Eg know-how on the creation of the product, quality issues, the manufacture procedure, details of suppliers. 
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preferences for non-disclosure becoming more permissive and enabling disclosure of 
anonymised trial data. 168  The change resulted in InterMune and AbbVie instigating 
proceedings DJDLQVW WKH(0$¶V LQWHQGHGGLVFORVXUHRI WULDOGDWD169 In the AbbVie case, the 
CJEU sent the decision to grant an injunction back to the General Court, because it had not 
required SURRI WKDW GLVFORVXUH FRQVWLWXWHG D µULVN RI VHULRXV DQG LUUHSDUDEOH KDUP¶ to 
fundamental rights to confidentiality.170 Both InterMune and AbbVie withdrew their cases 
after the EMA redacted the documents, 171  leaving the issue unresolved. The medical 
community remain concerned that the EMA¶VUHYLVHGSODQVWROLPLWDFFHVVSURYLGHGDWDin a 
OHVV XVDEOH IRUP DQG DOORZ µHYHQ GHWDLOV RI VWXG\ GHVLJQV VWDWLVWLFDO DQDO\VHV DQG VWXG\
UHVXOWV¶ to be redacted demonstrate they are reneging on disclosure in the public interest.172 
The implementation of the EU Clinical Trials Regulation scheduled for 2016 should resolve 
this issue with the introduction of the EU database.173 This makes it a statutory requirement 
for all clinical trials to be on the database while trials are ongoing, to be publicly accessible, 
with easily searchable information,174 and data is presumptively public (with confidentiality 
an exception in limited, specified contexts), which in the case of commercial confidentiality 
is VWLOOVXEMHFWWRµRYHUULGLQJSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLQGLVFORVXUH¶175 
 Access to trial data makes it easier for generics/biosimilars to target medicines as they 
are developed and the industry fear is that this facilitates market entry on the day that market 
exclusivity expires even where additional trials are required. In tandem with the 
Bolar/research exemptions (particularl in the UK), there is certainly likely to be  an erosion of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
167
  Generally see: Directorate-*HQHUDOIRU,QWHUQDO3ROLFLHV3ROLF\'HSDUWPHQW&LWL]HQV¶5LJKWVDQG
Constitutional Affairs: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs), Openness, transparency and access to 
documents and information in the EU (2013), www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/ 
493035/IPOL-LIBE_NT(2013)493035_EN.pdf; specifically in post-market contexts: Directive 
2010/84/EU amending, as regards pharmacovigilance, Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use [2010] OJ L348/74, Art 107(2) facilitating public access to 
adverse drug reaction reportage; Regulation 1235/2010 amending pharmacovigilance measures on 
advanced therapy medicinal products [2010] OJ L348/1. 
168
  Gathering momentum notably because of: the Cochrane Collaboration, www.cochrane.org/about-us; B 
Goldacre, Bad Pharma (Fourth Estate, 2012); the AllTrials.net collaborative initiative (2014), 
www.alltrials.net/find-out-more/. 
169
  Case C-390/13, T-73/13 EMA v InterMune [2014] 2 CMLR 21; Case C-389/13, T-44/13 EMA v AbbVie 
[2014] 2 CMLR 21. 
170
  Case C-389/13 (ibid), para. 43. 
171
  6%RGRQLµAbbVie Drops EU Court Bid to Block Clinical-Trial Data Release¶$SULOBloomberg News; 
,QWHU0XQHVLPLODUO\GURSSHGWKHLUDFWLRQLQ-XQH-0XUUD\µ$VXUSULVLQJGHYHORSPHQWLQWKHFDVHRI,QWHU0XQHYV
WKH(0$¶-XQHThe BMJ Blogs. 
172
  T Groves, µThe European Medicines Agency gets cold feet at the last minute¶,  (2014) 348 British Medical 
Journal g3561.  
173
  See Clinical Trials Regulation 536/2014/EC (n 32). 
174
  See Clinical Trials Regulation 536/2014/EC (n 32), Art 81, Recitals 67 and 68. 
175
  See Clinical Trials Regulation 536/2014/EC (n 32), Art 81(4), Recital 68 further distinguishing disclosure 
for validity outside of commerciality.  
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market lead for originators relying on more complex modern medicines struggling to fit 
within the existing two years between disclosure and marketability. This reflects the market-
based focus in supporting quicker market entry of generics/biosimilars. In addition, clinical 
trial transparency facilitates rationalisation of newly-valued medicines, maximising 
funding/resource allocation by reducing the scope to duplicate innovation. As such, the 
(0$¶V IRFXV IDOOV FRPSletely in line with the justifications inherent in changes within the 
patent system. In the context of market authorisation, how much quicker generic entry will be 
may rest on how much privacy the industry will be able to claw back under cover of know-
how (eg. product tolerances, supplier information, business practices, etc.) after the Trials 
Regulation database is operational. 
 This market-based focus is also evident in recent initiatives undertaken by the EMA 
following the introduction of its 2011 policy.176 
 
4.3.2  Increasing the pace of innovation to market 
European Regulations permit the compassionate use of originator, combination and newly-
valued medicines either in clinical trials or at pre-market authorisation where a life-
threatening condition has no µVDWLVIDFWRU\¶ treatment.177 Member States such as the UK have 
taken up this opportunity through their EAMS initiative to grant access to medicines 
identified as Promising Innovation Medicines (PIM, discerned after assessing the clinical trial 
data); or based on a scientific opinion.178  Although the 8.¶V Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency restrict access to medicines in Phase III trials (quality and 
comparative efficacy), in exceptional circumstances a Phase II trial (efficacy: usually first 
trial in sufferers) suffices. 179  
In addition, the EMA launched a pilot on adaptive licensing, 180  based on an 
understanding of evidence-based medicines as being a continuum, in which market entry can 
be shifted from post-Phase III trials to grant after earlier phases if trials are redesigned.  For 
H[DPSOH3KDVH , µILUVW LQPDQ¶ WR[LFLW\ WULDOVusually on healthy participants) and Phase II 
(efficacy) could be sufficient if combined (toxicity and efficacy on sufferers).  This has the 
advantage of reducing risks to the healthy and can be accessible to patients with a range of 
conditions, but could yield confusing results on dosage and effectiveness. 
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 n 42. 
177
  See Regulation 726/2004/EC (n 17), Arts 83(2), 3(1) and (2). 
178
  Eg IURPWKH(0$¶V&ommittee for Medicinal Products for Human Use. 
179
  Introduced by the MHRA in April 2014, see: MHRA, Guidance for Applicants for the EAMS (2014)  
180
  EMA documents on adaptive licensing pilot project, www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/ 
news_and_events/news/2014/03/news_detail_002046.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058004d5c1.     
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These initiatives appear to be regulating in the public interest by promoting public 
health and supporting better medicines, but they EOXUGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQµWULDOSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
DQG WUHDWLQJ µSDWLHQWV¶. Both EAMS and adaptive licensing are subject to entirely different 
legal protection, so liability regimes will need to be revised allocating responsibility between 
products and doctors for medicines with risk profiles which are much less apparent. In 
addition, there is general agreement that prescribing off-label must be strictly prohibited, but 
little evidence of strategies to ensure compliance. Making participants pay to receive 
medicines just by redefining them as paWLHQWVLVKDUGO\LQWKHLULQWHUHVWVRUVRFLHW\¶V Instead 
both of the early access initiatives can be argued to be in LQGXVWU\¶V interests, gaining new 
trial participants and earlier market entry. This has two counter-arguments: (1) EAMS 
participants are likely to skew trial data because trials customarily become available to the 
least sick in Phase II and Phase III to optimise the potential to prove efficacy (although it 
could be supposed there is always the potential for not including them or for lost data);181 and 
(2) adaptive licensing raises concerns over calculating SPC protection (up to first marketing 
or first adaptive license).  
Clearly the EMA is not acting as a neutral arbiter or benefitting special interests. 
Instead the EMA is paving the way for personalised medicines, maximising the potential to 
market drugs that would be in trials under the current procedure. This ensures that the new 
generation of originators (niche-busters),182 can have their reduced market returns (resulting 
from being effective for fewer patient groups) offset by drastically reduced R&D costs so 
they can maintain profit margins. This may align with industry producers invested in 
personalised medicines, but it more importantly ensures that Europe is positioned as a leading 
producer of personalised medicines. As such, this confirms that different agencies regulating 
very different aspects of medicines markets are linked by a common commitment to 
maximise market potential. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Existing discourses on regulatory prioritisation of competing interests presume a motivation 
which is fixed either on good outcomes or selfish interests. This analysis challenges those 
                                                          
181
  Eg Roche failed to report 80,000 illnesses/deaths in post-authorisation Phase IV trials: H. Marshall, 
µEuropean Medicines Agency assesses safety reporting at Roche¶$XJXVW The Lancet e331. 
182
  Personalised medicines, see: SG Gibson and T Lemmens, µNiche Markets and Evidence Assessment in 
Transition: a critical review of proposed drug reforms¶, (2014) 22(2) Medical Law Review Special Edition 
200. 
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presumptions, arguing instead that regulators are motivated to focus on the need to explain 
their behaviour relative to the goals that have been set for them by the various bodies that 
empower them. While changes between principals and agents may vary with the political, 
public policy, legislative or administrative prioritisations of the principal, this analysis 
exemplifies the importance of understanding regulation occurring between independent 
regulators. Assessing regulators through an understanding of how policy is translated into 
practice, reveals a single rationalising basis: goals are to be interpreted as market-oriented, 
prompting regulators to maximise market potential. This aligns with a procedural need for 
administrative accountability, but being substantive, it is systemically independent.  
 European medicines regulators are charged by those who empower them to act in the 
interests of securing economic/innovation growth and this has been tested across two 
independent agencies (EPOrg and the EMA). There is a clear link between how these goals 
are translated into practical regulatory activities, whether that is: interpreting existing 
legislation during decision-making processes (evidenced by patent regulators); legislatively 
in the introduction of new instruments (exemplified by the UK Legislative Reform (Patents) 
Order 2014); being supported judicially in expanded understandings (evidenced by the CJEU 
and the European Boards of Appeal); or implementing and operating regulatory initiatives 
(evidenced by the EMA). The unifying concept that rationalises all of the activities in order to 
appear to aim at growth is the need to act for the benefit of existing market potential. There is 
no suggestion that the compilation of sources that underpin the market potential identified 
here is relied upon by the regulators analysed, but they are clearly working to an uncannily 
similar market view which is evidenced in how changes in regulatory behaviour match 
market potential. Maximising market potential is the enduring factor, even though its 
implementation may change over the medium-term to reflect emerging market trends. It is 
this which registers as changing regulatory practices. In the political and policy domains, it is 
suggested that the credible commitment of the regulator ensures that market considerations 
endure within long-term goals, minimising the influences from extreme short-term political 
positioning and special interests, ensuring that strategic change happens slowly.  
 The side-effect of the focus on market-based justifications is that regulators dissipate 
their efforts, which should be focused on actually achieving or moving towards the goal set. 
In the context of the patent system, global and European shifts in industry capabilities and 
market demands incentivise regulators to promote the proliferation of originator medicines 
and create newly-valued medicine. Granting patents to the best able to develop first 
inevitably results in originator rights developing quicker and across more right-owners. This 
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comes at the cost of creating narrower rights to make room for more competitors, new 
combinations and newly-valued medicines. This has two main consequences: (1) it means 
WKDW WKH µHYHUJUHHQLQJ¶RI ULJKWV E\ UHFODLPLng innovation (me toos) is not being censured; 
and (2) it reduces the scope for originator patent holders to expand their existing research. 
While there are some justifications for curbing overly broad originator rights already granted 
in order to more fully exploit existing technology, this runs the risk of resulting in 
fragmentation. Fragmentation of patent rights dis-incentivises follow on research which 
cannot navigate patent thickets and, if it is close enough to down-stream markets, 
fragmentation can lead to product gluts which cannot be resolved by normal competitive 
mechanisms.  
 Comprehensively regulating licensing would have a far more constructive impact on 
mediating originator and follow on rights, but this is left largely unchecked by the patent 
regulator and this demonstrates an indifference to goal-achievement. At a pan-European level 
there is no need to consider all of the adverse impacts of these patent nuances, but individual 
nations such as the UK have been prompted to expand their research exemptions in order to 
encourage earlier generic entry to markets in the hope of securing domestic and global 
advantages against an increasing field of global competitors, resulting in a further erosion of 
originator rights. 
 The reliance on market potential as an explanatory link to the goals set in patent 
regulation is replicated by other regulators. The commitment of the CJEU to ensuring the 
flow of medicines is so strong it resulted in a departure from entrenched EU policy protecting 
the free movement of goods and the trade presence of parallel importers, but at the cost of 
increased costs of medicines. Clearly this is also not intended to be goal-achieving where it 
ignores the more appropriate tools of duties placed on the import/export of goods. Similarly, 
although the CJEU replicated the intention to benefit an expansion of originators and newly-
valued medicines, generously granting SPC protection, they have at least stopped short of 
63&µVWDFNLQJ¶ZKLFKFRXOGH[WHQGSDWHQWSURWHFWLRQIDUORQJHU than the upper five year limit. 
The EMA is dismantling data exclusivity in its haste to herald quicker market entry for 
generics/biosimilars, but even within the new Clinical Trials Regulation there is plenty of 
scope for secrecy so only time will tell how much lead time will be eroded in the process. 
Early access and adaptive licensing initiatives bring quicker market entry of less safe 
medicines, paving the way for niche-busters and taking advantage of the desperation of the 
ill. Such initiatives will undoubtedly reduce the costs of trials and erode safety standards even 
as they evidence innovation growth and it is difficult to see how this can benefit any long-
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term interests. Instead this promises to leave it to post-market regulators (high profile product 
withdrawals under the adverse drug reportage system; product liability cases and medical 
negligence claims) to resolve the problems that arise from pushing improperly tested 
medicines onto the market. 
 The goal of regulating to secure timely access to safe, effective and affordable 
medicines has never been more important, or so far from what regulators are actually 
motivated to achieve. 
